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ABSTRACT
Through the Eyes of the Post: American Media Coverage of the
Armenian Genocide
by
Jessica L. Taylor

Many historians refer to the Armenian Genocide of 1915 as the
first genocide of the twentieth century. In the context of the
first global war, the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were
systematically persecuted and many eliminated while the world
watched. Yet today, American memory and conception of the
Armenian Genocide is remarkably different from similar
historical events such as the Holocaust. The Armenian Genocide
and America’s reaction to it is a forgotten event in American
memory.

In an attempt to better understand this process of forgetting,
this thesis analyzes the Washington Post’s news coverage of the
Armenian Genocide. By cataloguing, categorizing, and analysizing
this news coverage, this thesis suggests Americans had
sufficient information about the events and national reaction to
it to form a memory. Therefore, the reasons for twenty-first
century collective loss of memory in the minds of Americans must
be traced to other sources.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“The breath and intensity of American
engagement in the effort to save the Armenians of
the Ottoman Empire is an important chapter in
American history, one that has been lost.
-Peter Balakain

Literature and research on the Armenian Genocide of World
War I is extensive. Authors, journalists, historians, political
scientists, and humanitarians have publicized, analyzed, and
debated over the intent, implementation, consequences, and
responsibility for the massacres. Armenian survivors have
published memoirs, telling the stories of how their people and
culture were killed. Hollywood has made movies recounting the
experiences of survivors. Yet, in spite of the substantial
amount of information available on the genocide, American memory
of the event is disproportionately small. When compared to the
Holocaust, a similar genocide of a religious minority group in
the context of a world war, Americans know and learn little
about the Armenian Genocide. There is currently no American
Genocide memorial in Washington D.C,1 while the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum has been open for sixteen years,
boasts thirty million visitors annually, and a website with

1

The Armenian Genocide Memorial of America is currently under
construction in Washington DC, with an anticipated opening date of 2011.
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information in over twenty languages serving online visitors
from over one hundred countries.2 Research currently available on
university courses on the Armenian Genocide reveals few American
universities include stand alone courses or content within
genocide courses about the Armenians.3 The failure of the
Armenian Genocide Resolution to pass in the United States House
of Representatives in 2007 received minimal attention or public
reaction.
Still, the contemporary relevance of the Armenian Genocide
can be seen in its influence on the diplomatic relations between
the United States and Turkey and in similar humanitarian crises
such as in Darfur. Historians still today attempt to combat the
ignorance and apathy of Americans through the publication of
books like The Burning Tigris, a New York Times best seller in
2003, which details America’s humanitarian response to the
Genocide.
The current state of American memory and conception of the
Armenian Genocide raises a number of issues and questions. Have
Americans forgotten about the Armenian Genocide? Did Americans
know of the Armenian Genocide at the time of its occurrence? In
what context did Americans learn about the Armenian Genocide?

2

“About the Museum,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
http://www.ushmm.org/museum/mission/ (accessed February 25, 2009).
3
Christina Pelosky, “Content Analysis of Undergraduate Courses and
Course Content on the Armenian Genocide in United States Higher Education”
(doctoral dissertation, Lynn University, 2005), 86-92.
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How did Americans react to knowledge of the Armenian Genocide
and did they respond with action?
Answering questions about the Armenian Genocide must first
begin with a definition and framework of genocide. Crimes
against humanity have existed in many forms throughout human
history, and for centuries genocide was “a crime without a
name.”4 A Polish-Jewish jurist by the name of Ralph Lemkin coined
the term genocide during World War II to describe the Nazi
campaigns against the Jews, years after the crimes committed
against the Armenians had taken place. Lemkin made it his life’s
work to secure a convention against genocide from the newly
formed United Nations after World War II. He succeeded with the
1948 adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide.5 Today it is the UN Convention’s
definition that defines international law concerning cases of
genocide.
Regardless of the international legal framings of
genocide, historians and social scientists continue to define
genocide in light of “ambiguities of the Genocide Convention and
its constituent debates.”6 Genocide frameworks vary in the

4

James T. Fussell, “A Crime Without a Name,” Prevent Genocide
International, February 11, 2004,
http://www.preventgenocide.org/genocide/crimewithoutaname.htm (accessed April
4, 2009).
5
Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge,
2006), 8-11.
6
Jones, 15.
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position they take on key concepts such as victim, agent, scale,
strategy, and intent. Minor variations in the terminology can
drastically alter the breath of an author’s definition of
genocide. The exact definition of genocide is crucial when
making decisions to apply the term to specific historical
events, and as ambiguities in the definition opens the door to
the claims of genocide deniers and rationalizes. The definition
of genocide used for this study is borrowed from Adam Jones and
is as follows: Genocide is “the actualization of the intent,
however successfully carried out, to murder in whole or in
substantial part any national, ethnic, racial, religious,
political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are
defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.”7
Based on the elements of this definition, the term genocide
is applied in this study to the case of the Armenians. Use of
the term genocide to label the mass killing of Armenians in
World War I began almost immediately following the coining of
the word. Since then the word has become the symbolic rope in an
ongoing intellectual tug-of-war between pro-Armenian and proTurkish writers, as if absence of the word in some way erases
the reality of the massive loss of life. Intent has become the
central issue in the debate among scholars concerning the use of
the term genocide. Pinpointing the exact moment of intent in the
7

Jones, 22; italics in the original.
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perpetration of genocide is extremely difficult though, as
genocidal intent often escalates over time and is not always the
result of a clearly discernable shift.8 Still, the term genocide
is easily defendable as applicable to the case of the Armenians,
and “the important thing, however, is not the term, but rather
the moral position that recognizes the crime and condemns it.”9
Use of the term genocide does however raise two points of
concern. First as the term genocide was not in existence at the
time of the crimes against the Armenians, it is nowhere present
in news reports, including those of the Washington Post, which
is the basis for this study. As the Post readers learned about
the violent persecution of the Armenians occurring during the
course of World War I, they did not have the luxury of
historical perspective available today. The true genocidal
nature of the events may not have been clear as they were
unfolding in the media coverage. Consequently the term genocide
will be used sparingly to refer to the events as described in
actual newspaper articles. Instead terms such as massacre or
persecution will be used as a descriptive label. Similarly, a
second point of concern is the connotation of the terms massacre
or persecution. In the case of this thesis, the terms massacre

8

Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism
and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 96.
9
Taner Açkam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of
Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 9.
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and persecution are not used to define any crime against the
Armenians in the singular sense or as alternative options to the
term genocide. Instead, the terms are used to describe numerous
individual events that all combined to make up a whole event,
which here is discussed historically as the Armenian Genocide.
To begin looking at American conception of the Armenian
Genocide, it is necessary to first recognize at least some
American familiarity with the Armenians prior to World War I.
The American public was first introduced to the Armenians of
Ottoman Turkey almost a century before the First World War began
through foreign missionary organizations. The American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions arose out of the social
forces of the Second Great Awakening and emphasized the spread
of Christianity to every region of the world. Its first
missionaries arrived in Turkey in the 1820s and established the
foundation for mission work that would last over a hundred
years. Missionaries published accounts of their experiences in
the Near East through memoirs and biographies in which they
introduced the American public to the minority peoples and
culture of Turkey. The authors often idealized the subjects of
their efforts, and the result was “both an enlarged store of
knowledge and a romantic perception of the Near East.”10

10

Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary
Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1971), 39

12

American mission work in Turkey incorporated an educational
element into their efforts, establishing schools for Christian
minority groups throughout the country. By 1914, America had
developed the largest network of schools of any country,
concentrated primarily in Anatolia among the Armenians. As the
missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire grew throughout the
nineteenth century, so to did the mission groups’ influence on
American policy. The internationalism of mission work, however,
“contrasted with the political isolationism of the United States
government.”11 American diplomats in Turkey were chiefly
concerned with protecting American citizens, and the United
States State Department worked to gain concessions and
exemptions for Americans from Ottoman law and protection of
American property and investments in Turkey.12 The American
missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire helped to publicize a
romantic view of the Armenians, which was a firmly established
by the eve of World War I.
When the First World War began, American access to
information about the Armenians was supplemented by the American
Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau. Appointed by President
Wilson, and arriving in Constantinople just months before the
outbreak of the war, Morgenthau became the eyes and ears of the

11
12

Grabill, 38.
Grabill, 1-39.
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United States government for information regarding the massacre
of Armenians. The United States neutrality during the early war
years allowed for ongoing diplomatic relations with Turkey until
April 1917, when Turkey broke relations only at the behest of
Germany.13 During that time, Morgenthau had access to information
about the Armenians that the Allied countries did not. He
received dispatches from American consuls from around the
Ottoman Empire and passed them on to the State Department. When
the massacre of Armenians began, the Ottoman government cut the
cable wires from Anatolia and censored diplomatic
communications. American consuls were forced to find secret ways
to transmit messages and use a shorthand code to conceal the
content. American missionaries smuggled letters and eyewitness
accounts the American embassy to be passed along to the State
Department. Morgenthau used the dispatches he received,
combining information on his own experiences and insights, to
confirm reports about the massacres circulating in the American
press. Accurate and detailed information about the atrocities
also made its way to relief organizations to be used as fuel to
mobilize relief efforts.14 The varied access to information about

13

Robert L. Daniel, “The Armenian Question and American-Turkish
Relations, 1914-1927,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46, no. 2
(Sept 1959), 257.
14
Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and
America’s Response ( New York: Perennial, 2003), 224, 252, 267, 286.
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the Armenians made Americans some of the most informed citizens
in the world during the early war years.
This thesis will make use of media coverage from the
Washington Post as a case study to examine the prominence and
presentation of news stories on the Armenian Genocide. As a
national daily newspaper at the pulse of American politics, the
Post’s treatment of the Armenian Genocide can provide insight on
the way in which American citizens and political leaders in the
nation’s capital were first exposed to the tragic massacres. The
Post was founded in 1877 by Stilson Hutchins. Initially destined
to be a democratic daily among the southern sympathies in the
nation’s capital, Huthcins had aspirations for the paper to gain
the ear of some of the most powerful men in the country. The
first edition appeared on December 6, was four pages, and was
sold at three cents.15
By the time the First World War began in Europe, the Post
was boasting a twelve page weekday edition and a seventy-four
page Sunday edition. In August 1914 the paper ran a triple eight
column headline announcing the news of European hostilities.
Most American dailies of the early twentieth century did not
maintain staff correspondents in international news centers but

15

Chalmers McGeagh Roberts, The Washington Post: The First 100 Years
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 3-9.
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instead depended on press associations for outside information,16
and the Post was no exception. The Post had no foreign
correspondents and relied on dispatches from the Associated
Press or International News Service to cover the war.17 From the
start of the war, the Post strongly advocated American
neutrality and strived to present the German side of the war
despite the inaccessibility of information from Germany. Once it
became clear the United States would enter the war, the Post
became a supporter of the war effort until the end.18
News about the massacre of Armenians began almost
immediately following their outbreak, giving Americans current
and ongoing updates. The Washington Post’s reporting of the
Armenian Genocide had the potential to influence readers’
impression of the massacres. The media coverage also had the
potential to sway American reaction for or against American
intervention in Turkey. The purpose of this thesis is to examine
a small component of American memory of the Armenian Genocide in
an effort to begin answering the broader questions about the
current state of American consciousness. Memory begins with a
foundation. American media coverage during the course of the
Armenian Genocide provided part of that foundation. Media

16

Edwin Emery and Michael Emery, The Press and America: An
Interpretative History of the Mass Media, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1988), 282.
17
Roberts, 56.
18
Emery and Emery, 294; Roberts, 125-128, 136-138.
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coverage can not only inform readers but also report on and
shape their opinions. The content and vocabulary of the
reporting can develop a framework for understanding historical
events. Analysis of the media coverage of the Armenian Genocide
can establish a context of how and what Americans learned about
the event.
News coverage, as opposed to diplomatic correspondence or
official communications, has implications for drawing
conclusions about average Americans. News accounts were
accessible and intelligible to ordinary people. In addition to
offering a context for learning about the massacres, media
coverage offers an understanding of American’s reaction to the
events through reports on relief work and political action. From
this perspective, questions on American comprehension of the
Armenian Genocide can begin to be answered.

17

CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Armenians in Ottoman Turkey

The Armenians of Turkey are a Christian minority group with
a rich cultural history. Known to have been one of the earliest
groups to convert to Christianity, the ancient Armenian nation
is also possibly the first state to have officially accepted the
religion. The geographic core of the Armenian ancestral homeland
has at various times throughout history been located on the
frontier of numerous empires, causing the group to suffer as a
result. The last great Armenian kingdom of Cilicia fell in 1375
to the Mamluks. The rise of the Ottoman dynasty in Anatolia in
the fourteenth century began a period of Turkish control of the
Armenians which lasted until the early twentieth century.
Soon after the Ottoman conquest of the Constantinople in
1453, Sultan Mehmet II brought Armenians, along with other
religious and ethnic minority groups, to settle the new capital.
As the Empire expanded its reach in Anatolia toward the Black
Sea region, it incorporated more and more Armenians. The
Ottomans dealt with the diverse populations it was absorbing by
organizing non-Muslim peoples into millets or officially
recognized communities. The millet system was not a static

18

institution but instead evolved over time, and use of the term
millet to describe the formal organization of a semi-autonomous
religious community was not common until the early nineteenth
century.19 Religion was the defining characteristic of the millet
system, as opposed to language or shared origin, as the basis of
society. Millets were ruled indirectly by the Ottoman state,
preferring instead to pass down administrative authority to the
religious head of the millet.20 The communities were allowed to
organize themselves around their own religious laws under the
“jurisdiction of diverse patriarchates,”21 which controlled many
civic aspects of the community’s organization. A by-product of
the millet system was that the ethnic and religious minority
groups in the Ottoman Empire were able to maintain their
heritage in the form of their language, culture, and traditions,
free from the threat of forced assimilation. While the various
millets held a semi-autonomous status for administrative
purposes, their members did not share equality with Muslim
subjects. The multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman state meant it
could not rely on a shared language or culture among its people
19

For further explanation on the definition and evolution of the millet
system see Benjamin Braude “Foundation of Myth of the Millet System,” in
Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural
Society, vol. 2, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and
Meier Publishers, 1982), 69-87; and Roderic Davison, “The Millets as Agents
of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” also in Christians and
Jews in the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 319-321.
20
Ronald Suny, “Empire and Nation: Armenians, Turks and the End of the
Ottoman Empire,” Armenian Forum 1, no. 2 (1998), 24.
21
Stephan Astourian, “The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation,” The
History Teacher 23, no. 2 (Feb 1990), 117.
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for stability. Instead of attempting to “break down the
boundaries of these communities and homogenize the population of
the empire...around a single identity,”22 the traditional Ottoman
policy was to use “distinctions of hierarchy between rulers and
ruler, Muslim and non-Muslim,”23 to organize society.
Institutionalized inequality for all non-Muslims subjects became
the method of social organization in the Empire.
It was within these distinctions of hierarchy that the
Armenian Christians lived as unequal citizens, and civil
oppression characterized their existence. The religious freedoms
enjoyed by non-Muslims concerned only their private status; in
the civil sector they did not enjoy equal rights with Muslims.
They were denied the right to serve in many government posts,24
and often they had to wear distinctive clothing or certain
colors to denote them as non-Muslims.25 Non-Muslims were free
from conscription in the Ottoman military, a desired freedom,
but only in exchange for payment of a head tax placed on all
non-Muslim males. As a result “there came into being two
societies, Muslim and non-Muslim, which did not have equal

22

Suny, 24.
Suny, 25.
24
Carter Findley, “The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of NonMushms in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy,” in Christians and Jews in the
Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 339.
25
H. Alojian, “Origins of the Armenian Colony in Constantinople,”
Armenian Review VII, no. 2 (1954), 119.
23
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rights.”26 As long as the Ottoman Empire was content with a nonhomogenous society, the Armenians continued a stable existence
of inequality.
Still the civil oppression characteristic of the millet
system was not without its benefits to the Armenian community.
The religious freedom it provided within the community allowed
the Armenian Church to maintain a place of authority, and its
role as the centralizing force in the Armenian community grew
between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.27 As Muslim
charitable and welfare organizations revolved around religion,
the Armenians had to supplement their community with similar
institutions, thus creating a vast charitable network. The
nature of the millet system fostered a tight knit community,
which allowed for the preferential treatment of community
members in industry. Armenians were excluded from areas where
they might accrue influence, so they turned to other
professions. As they were limited to a smaller number of
professions, they were able to specialize and become highly
qualified in those areas. They climbed the economic ladder and
accrued wealth and power. In this context, “whatever

26

Enver Ziya Karal, “Non-Muslim Representatives in the First
Constitutional Assembly, 1876-1877,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman
Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 387.
27
Kevork B. Bardakjian “The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of
Constantinople,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The
Functioning of a Plural Society, vol. 1, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard
Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982),96.
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discriminations, abuses and inferiority the Armenians were
forced to endure must be weighed alongside the considerable
benefits this cultural and political autonomy provided.”28
While the millet system allowed the Armenian community to
prosper in many ways, it also created a social context for
oppression with a wide range of severity. Suppression of civil
rights, exclusion from the government, and the unequal legal
status of a minority group are factors that can create an
opportunity for further discrimination, even violent
intolerance. In the organized suppression of a second class
citizenry, massacre or genocide of a particular minority group
can occur. The set of legal disabilities denying a minority
institutional protection, and redress in the event of actual
victimization, is “one of the foremost facts affording
persecution in a sociopolitical system.”29 The millet system
created just such a circumstance, and violent victimization
eventually became the case for the Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire.
Although the Armenian community in Turkey lived and
prospered under Ottoman rule for centuries, the rise of Armenian
and Greek millets to a place of economic strength by the midnineteenth century gave members of these communities increased
28

Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 101.
29
Vahakn Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the TurkoArmenian Conflict (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 15.
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wealth and power through industry, trade, and finance. Armenians
excelled in mining, shipping, milling, clothing manufacturing,
as well as banking and money lending, areas of the economy where
the Turkish government was reluctant to increase its control. It
was “in the absence of competition from members of the dominant
group, the Armenian merchant class...attained a high degree of
prosperity.”30 The characteristics of the millet system
previously discussed were critical in these developments, and
individuals used these circumstances to gain opportunities and
prosperity in the economic sector. In addition Armenians had the
help of coreligionists outside the Empire’s borders, the
friendship of European states, and the advantages provided
during the Ottoman reform era. As the economic control of the
Ottoman government steadily declined, the Armenian community’s
influence grew along side that of the European powers.31
As a result of the Armenian community’s increased economic
strength and influence by the middle of the nineteenth century,
the Armenian communities in Europe, as well as in Turkey, were
considered in the height of an Armenian Renaissance. The
Armenian Renaissance was a cultural revival of their history and
civilization, which had distinct political overtones in the form
30
Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Structural-Functional Components of Genocide:
A Victimological Approach to the Armenian Case,” in Victimology, ed. Israel
Drapkin and Emilio Viano (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1974), 127.
31
Charles Issawi, “The Transformation of the Economic Position of the
Millets in the Nineteenth Century,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman
Empire, vol. 2, ed. Braude and Lewis, 261-264.
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of a growth of nationalistic sentiment. Beginning in the
Diaspora with the Mekhitarist Congregation of Venice, founded in
1701, advances such as the printing press, educational revival
brought about through missionary activity, resurgence of
nationalistic literature, and the modernization of the Armenian
language all combined to create a ripe atmosphere for the growth
of a large intelligentsia class. Similar in the European
Renaissance, the popularity of vernaculars, codification of the
Armenian vernacular, and translation of foreign classics, all
important milestones in the rise of nationalism, helped to
spread liberal ideals. This Armenian cultural awakening fed the
fires of a strengthening independence movement and “wrought
powerful changes in the community, the most significant of which
was perhaps the sense of unity it stirred among the Armenians.”32
The nationalistic movement growing in the Armenian
community as part of the Renaissance contained a democratic
thread. The Armenian elite sent their children to European
universities to be educated, and it was there that they learned
about democracy, nationalism, and “the new western ideas of
their time.”33 They brought these ideals back home and
synthesized them with the cultural awakening, renewing their
pride in Armenian history. Armenian leaders came to view a

32

Bardakjian, 96.
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd ed (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 62.
33
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democratic constitutional system with representatives elected by
members of the millet as a crucial step in the move towards
autonomy.34 An increase in Armenian nationalistic fervor was one
of many factors that led to a decline in the centuries old
harmonious relationship between the Armenians and the Turkish
government. It challenged the basic foundation of Ottoman social
and political dominance by confronting the “theory and practice
of Muslim superiority and Armenian inferiority.”35 By fusing a
distinct and independent culture within the Ottoman Empire with
western political ideology, the Armenians challenged the heart
of the Ottoman social order and aligned itself closer with
European principles.36
At the same time the Armenian liberal intelligentsia was
growing in strength and influence many eastern Anatolian
Armenians of the lower classes suffered from Ottoman oppression.
As the Ottoman Empire began steadily to decline in the last half
of the nineteenth century, corruption in the government spread.
Armenians now had to pay increased taxes to government tax
collectors. As many Armenians in Anatolia lived in a sort of
“feudal servitude” to their Kurdish neighbors, they suffered

34

Harry Jewell Sarkiss, “The Armenian Renaissance, 1500-1863,” The
Journal of Modern History 9, no. 4 (Dec 1937), 433-448.
35
Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of
1894-1896,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 24, no. 3 (July 1982),
506.
36
Simon Payaslian, The History of Armenia From Origins to the Present
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 117-120.
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from a dual taxation, one to the Ottoman government and the
other to local Kurdish tribal leaders. When they defaulted on
their payments to the Kurds, Armenian villages were attacked,
looted, and pillaged as punishment. Armenians appealed to the
Ottoman government for reform with little success. The situation
continued to worsen in the years leading up to the turn of the
century, and the European Powers used the situation as a
strategy to increase their influence in the Ottoman state. This
was a factor contributing to the deterioration of the TurkoArmenian relationship.

Armenians and the European Powers

From a European standpoint in the nineteenth century, the
vulnerable status of the Armenians was part of a larger “Eastern
Question.” The corruption and decline of the Ottoman Empire led
to political power struggles among the European Powers over the
geographical and political future of the Empire. The fate of
Ottoman lands became a focus of international rivalries,
competition for economic expansion, and the balance of European
power. This conundrum became known as the Eastern Question,37 and
the Armenians became “pawns in Europe’s struggle for power and
37

Simon Bromley, “The States-system in the Middle East: Origins,
Development and Prospects,” in A Companion to the History of the Middle East,
ed. Youssef M. Choueiri (Malden: Blackwell Publishing), 507. The Eastern
Question is traditionally dated from 1774 to 1923.
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dominance.”38 Total collapse of the Ottoman Empire was
potentially dangerous, given the competing interests, and so the
general European consensus was to prop up the Empire. Yet the
individual European Powers indulgenced in furthering their own
causes. Russia focused on a slow erosion of Turkish territory,
and continuously gave assistance to different religious groups
or invaded the Balkan regions on the pretense of assisting
Ottoman subjects. France and Great Britain wanted to curb
Russia’s influence in the region; Britain valued increased
influence in Persia and Egypt near its India colony, while
France vied for power in Syria and Lebanon. In this way,
“through their wars and support of the separatist goals of
rebellious Ottoman subjects, European states abetted the very
process of fragmentation that they feared, and were seeking to
avoid.”39
Russia’s geographical proximity to Turkish Armenia gave her
the opportunity to develop a special relationship with the
Turkish Armenians, a relationship that was clouded by Russia’s
expansionist aims. Russia had long dreamed of controlling the
Straits, her only true access to the Mediterranean Sea. Gaining
control of the Straits dominated Russia’s foreign policy and
diplomacy with Turkey. In the late nineteenth century, when the
38
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Turkish Armenian community was in a precarious situation, they
believed their best chance for autonomy from the Ottoman
government was with help from an outside power that would serve
as their protector. Russia was a neighbor, had a large Armenian
population within its borders, and had at times used its own
Armenian population as a reason to increase its influence in the
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government felt enormous pressure
from Russia in the Balkans and on its eastern borders and was
suspicious of Russia’s intentions toward Armenia.40
It was in the context of international rivalries that
pressure from European powers for development and westernization
helped to instigate Ottoman reforms. Foreign governments may
have had differing motivations for desiring reform, yet all the
Great Powers had a stake in the future of the Empire.
Nationalist movements sprung up in many of the empire’s regions
and weakened the state’s unity. The Sublime Porte41 hoped reform
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would target the heart of nationalistic tendencies, and
improvement of the status of non-Muslim citizens would
circumvent further intervention of international powers under
the guise of protector. In the attempt to stem this tide of
internal decline and international pressure, the Ottoman
government launched an era of reform during the nineteenth
century. At the heart of the reforms was the equality of Muslim
and non-Muslim subjects. As seen previously, the millet system
kept non-Muslim communities segregated and at the bottom of the
social hierarchy, and Ottoman reforms proposed to reverse this
segregation. The reform era from 1839-1876, known as the
Tanzimat (Reorganization), began with the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane
proclamation in 1839 and culminated with the Constitution in
1876. In the Hatt-i Şerif, Sultan Abdulmecid I proclaimed the
equality of peoples of all religions and updated the military
conscriptions laws to include non-Muslims. A second decree on
February 18, 1856, the Hatti-i Humayun (Imperial Rescript), went
even further to confirm the equality of all the Empire’s peoples
and called for the reorganization of the state. The reform era
culminated with the first written constitution, which
established a limited monarchy over all Ottoman subjects
regardless of religion.42 The radical reforms promulgated during
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this reform era targeted the very core of Ottoman social
organization and attempted to redefine social status as one
based on secular loyalty to the state instead of religion.
For many reasons the implementation of Ottoman reform never
reached as high as its promise. In many ways the reform measures
were used as “weapons of diplomacy in times of international
crisis,”43 instead of as genuine measures of change. The push for
equality of all subjects went against a centuries old premise of
the superiority of Muslims and Islam as the source of legitimacy
for government. It meant a revision of the basis of citizenship
from one of religion to one in which all citizens were equal in
the eyes of the state. Such a change was a complex process, and
the anticipated break with tradition was a traumatic shock to
the Muslim psyche, one which many Muslims, and even Christians,
lashed out against.44
Despite Ottoman attempts at reform, nationalistic movements
among minority groups in the Empire continued to grow. Demands
for equality evolved into demands for autonomy.45 These demands
turned violent in the Balkan provinces in the spring of 1876,
with the outbreak of a Balkan rebellion. Russia intervened
militarily, and subsequently won a victory over the Ottomans,
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drawing the attention of the other Great Powers. The Russian
victory created a major crisis and sparked international
tensions, as the fate of the Ottoman Empire became evident, and
additionally brought the Armenian question into the
international arena. For the Armenians, it presented an
opportunity, but ultimate disappointment, on the road toward
securing international protection. The Armenians hoped to use
Russia’s newly enhanced political power as a chance to gain a
protector. A petition addressed to Tsar Alexander II from the
Armenian national assembly asked simply “What we now hope for,
and what we are now so bold as to request, is that the form of
administration granted to the Christians in Thrace should also
be granted to the Armenians. The cries torn from our hearts
would thus be heard and our miseries ended.”46 With former
Russian ambassador to Turkey Grand Duke Nicolas Pavlovich
Ignatiev to champion their cause, the Tsar instructed that the
Armenian question be taken into consideration at the peace
treaty negotiations to the surprise of the Ottomans. Article 16
of the agreement addressed the Armenian issue but did not
provide the Armenians with the independence they so desired.
They had hoped Russia would support them to the fullest but were
content that the article acknowledged the need for immediate
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reforms in Armenia, and that its people were under threat from
the Kurds and Circassians. In effect the Russian army was to
oversee reforms and occupy the regions until the Porte had
implemented the changes. This protection was an important step
on the road to independence, and the Armenians were satisfied to
have Russia as a protector.47
Yet, the advances made for the Armenians in the San Stefano
Treaty were fleeting. International disapproval of the treaty
forced revision of the agreements to include other European
powers, to the detriment of the Armenians. Britain strongly
opposed the severe terms placed on the Ottomans at San Stefano
and feared Russian attempts to crush the Ottomans and partition
the country. Britain strategically sent Indian troops to occupy
Cyprus in order to force Russia to agree to revise the treaty and
refer the Eastern Question to the Congress of Berlin.48 The Berlin
Conference forced the European Powers to address the Armenian
question. Reference to the Armenian Question in Article 16 of the
San Stefano agreement was replaced by Article 61 of the Treaty of
Berlin, an article that reduced the concessions given to the
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Armenians under the former article and “disappointed the
Armenians sorely.”49
After the Berlin Conference, the Armenians realized their
biggest potential ally was too weak politically to truly help
them, and their actions had critically injured their
relationship with the Ottoman government. In addition, the Porte
resisted implementation of the proposed reforms under Article
61, while the European powers waned in enforcing them. In their
frustration at the turn of events, the Armenians felt compelled
to turn to extra-legal means of resistance. The limited reforms
they had gained were never enforced, and conditions with their
Kurdish neighbors were not improving.
Their frustration and disappointment, combined with the
Armenian cultural awakening, became the ideological foundation
for a revolutionary movement based on “emancipatory and
revolutionary nationalism...and strategic thinking for the
purpose of self defense.”50 In the early 1880s, these
revolutionary movements began to spring up in the Diaspora and
spread to Anatolia. Militant in nature, the new revolutionary
49
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groups bolstered the morale in Armenian communities, which was
low due to discrimination at the hands of Turkish oppressors.
The martial arm of these organizations roamed the countryside,
protecting the innocent and threatening regular Turkish army
units and armed Kurds. They focused on providing a defense
network and spreading revolutionary ideas about independence to
the Armenian millet. These military groups represented
frustration with the slow, diplomatic processes of reform and a
desire for increased tangible protection against daily
subjugation.
The Armenian Revolutionary Movement had several
representative parties, the most prominent among them being the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, (also known as the Dashnaks)
and the Hunchak Revolutionary Party. These groups and others
were influenced by Marxist ideas and shared the general goal of
increased autonomy for the Armenians. The different
revolutionary groups often disagreed on their definition of
reform goals and the means of implementing them and competed for
support among the community. While the revolutionary movement
gave the Armenian community a sense of empowerment, it also
heightened tensions with the Kurds in the eastern provinces and
the Porte. Armenian guerilla bands operating in the mountains
and rugged terrain attacked Turkish military units and armed
Kurdish bands. They assaulted Turkish villages and secretly
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stockpiled arms for the Armenian population. However alarming
the thought of armed Armenians was to the Porte, the
revolutionary movements rarely had a large support base in the
community. The revolutionary groups fought among each other over
policy and had to employ heavy propaganda campaigns to sway
Armenians to their point of view.51
The Porte viewed Armenian revolutionary activity with
suspicion, particularly with regard to the Armenians in Anatolia,
due to their close proximity to Russia. In light of the guerilla
violence, Sultan Abdul Hamid II established gendarme cavalry
units comprised of Kurdish volunteers, named the Hamidiye
regiments, to patrol the region. The regiments gave the Kurds a
considerable amount of authority, and the Porte restrained from
censuring the regiments for excessive behaviors in an effort to
encourage their loyalty to the government.52 Their role was to
patrol the border regions and monitor the Armenians, Kurds, and
Turkish nobles. Instead, the Armenians became their primary
target, suffering the worst consequences.53 Armenian revolutionary
activities and the presence of the Hamidiye regiments finally
reached a climax in the summer of 1894. Armenians living in
village of Sassoun, being overburdened by dual taxation and
Kurdish attempts to take their land, ultimately rebelled. The
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Armenian “insurrection,” as it was called by the Ottomans, was
savagely put down by regular Turkish military, Hamidiye
regiments, and Kurdish villagers in a manner that alerted the
European powers.54 Russia, France, and Britain drafted a
memorandum that included proposed reforms for the six provinces
with Armenians populations in reaction to the events in Sassoun
and sent it to the Porte in the spring of 1895. Pressure for
reforms further inflamed tensions in eastern Anatolia, which were
“seen as another example of European imperialism, one step on the
road to Armenian independence,”55 and provoked further intercommunal violence. As a result, the Ottoman government was slow
to approve the reforms and even slower to enact proposed changes.
In the months following the European reform proposal,
violent confrontations continued in Anatolia, consisting of the
organized massacre of Armenians to suppress rebellion. The
escalating brutality and delayed reforms provoked a response from
Armenian revolutionary groups. In September 1895, an Armenian
nationalist organization, the Hunchakist party, organized a
protest march in Istanbul to accelerate the implementation of the
reforms that the European powers had proposed to the sultan. The
march ended in violence as crowds in the city reacted brutally to
the protest and launched vicious outbursts against Armenians all
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over the empire, especially in the vilayets where reforms were
scheduled to take effect. The massacres intensified even further
in August of 1896 when members of the Dashnak Revolutionary Party
invaded the Imperial Ottoman Bank “with the aim of instigating
foreign intervention.”56 This incident aggravated the tensions and
launched a massive massacre of Armenians in the capital.57
The reasons for the 1894-1896 Armenian massacres must be
understood within “the context of Armenian-Ottoman relations, and
by the unintentional consequences of the Armenian renaissance.”58
Robert Melson examines the theoretical framework for the 18941896 massacres. He argues the Armenian Renaissance and the
presence of so many Armenians near the border with a hostile
neighbor, set in the context of the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire, can explain how the Porte came to view the Armenians as a
threat. The increased economic power of the community, and
strengthened nationalistic ideology as a result of the
Renaissance, combined with Armenian connections in the Diaspora
which enabled them to reach out to foreign powers for support,
threatened the Ottoman government’s power. The weakening of the
Empire forced the Porte to take drastic measures to keep the
Empire from further disintegration, including suppression of
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dissenters who threatened the historical status quo. Massacre was
the means of choice to accomplish this goal.59
Additionally it is necessary to delineate the 1890s events
as massacres and not genocide. The massacres were partial in
nature, took place in urban centers, limiting the targets to men,
and killing them outright in locations close to their home or
business.

The killings lasted only a few days and generally

began and ended abruptly, in some cases with the ringing of a
bell. The intent was not the elimination of an entire ethnic
group, as “there were no wholesale deportations and massacres, as
the main purpose of these massacres involved large-scale
economic, cultural, and psychological destruction through
selective massacre.”60 Yet, while full scale genocide may not have
been the intent, the 1890s massacres are a key turning point in
the desperation felt by the Porte, and its willingness to condone
violence as a method for unification and rejuvenation of the
Empire.
The 1895 reforms the sultan announced as a result of the
massacres and international pressure were never implemented. This
left the Armenian question unresolved, making it a potential
source of future conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising the
1890s persecutions were only a precedent for additional massacres
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to follow. In the last few years of the nineteenth century and
the opening years of the twentieth, the decay of the Ottoman
Empire continued. Ottoman liberals and intelligentsia created a
movement that asserted that drastic change was needed to save the
Empire from dissolution. Known as the Young Turk movement, it
adopted western institutions and ideologies as a basis for change
in an effort to protect against the encroaching West. The
movement spouted democratic characteristics such as
constitutional government and freedom from authoritarian sultans,
all within the context of Turkish social customs. Although it
started as a movement of reform, over time the ideals of
nationalism and Turkish supremacy spread among the Young Turks
and made it less and less appealing to ethnic and religious
minority groups.61
In a virtually bloodless revolution, the Young Turk party,
or the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), came to power in
July of 1908, forcing Sultan Abdul Hamid II to reinstate the
constitution of 1876. In the initial days following the
revolution, Armenian leaders of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties
both supported the CUP and pledged cooperation. However, the wave
of good feelings did not last as the CUP became increasingly
devoted to the idea of Pan-Turkism. Pan-Turkism rejected liberal
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ideals of equality of all Ottoman subjects, consequently
excluding “Armenians not just from state power...but also from
society at large.”62 As a result, Armenian communities worked to
gather support in order to elect their own people to Parliament.
They labored to amass backing for their independence movement and
to revive nationalistic sentiment. Armenian leaders tried to
entice CUP support, but the new leaders were distracted with
problems in the Balkans and were at war almost immediately upon
gaining power, thus giving little attention to the Armenian
question.63
The Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century
brought the Eastern Question and the future of the Ottoman Empire
further into the international arena. Dissolution of the Empire
began to seem more and more inevitable, and the European powers
scrambled to ensure they would benefit from the decline of the
Empire. The eastern border of the Empire was of great concern to
both Russia and Great Britain for its strategic geographic
proximity to trade with India and the Far East. Germany and
France were also concerned with the future of the Ottoman Empire,
as they had economic investments in the Empire. New political
alliances with the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance brought
further complications to the Armenian question, which had not
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existed at the Berlin Conference. Foreign concern over the
Armenians was a symptom of international tensions and rivalry
early in the century, but none of the Powers “wanted partition at
the moment, and none wanted war at the moment over the Armenian
question.”64 Reform in Turkey became imperative for the Powers to
continue their policy of propping up the Empire as a way to
maintain a European balance of power. Yet the massive loss of
European territory at the end of the Balkan Wars made it
abundantly clear Turkey was extremely vulnerable to its internal
dissents.
To deal with the intensification of Turkish-Armenian tension
brought on by the Balkan Wars, Russia spearheaded another
proposed reform program. Months of negotiations resulted in a
proposal recommending the establishment of a single Armenian
vilayet (province) comprised of the six eastern provinces to be
headed by a Christian governor. In addition, it called for an
administrative council and provisional assembly to oversee the
province and the dissolution of the Kurdish Hamidiye regiment.
The agreement concluded in February 1914 had six European powers
signatories to guarantee implementation of these reforms.65 The
reform agreement was never put into action, but it did halt
European military intervention early in 1914. Yet, other events
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brought the European powers to war, with one consequence being
the escalation of the Armenian question within the Ottoman Empire
and international reaction to it.

Genocide

The Armenians found themselves in a vulnerable position at
the beginning of World War I. The Ottoman Empire entered the war
on the side of the Central Powers, leaving the Armenians cut off
from both Russia and Great Britain. In previous military disputes
between Turkey and Russia, the eastern Armenian communities were
considered suspects of suspicion as a result of their ties to
Russia. The Great War was no exception. The Ottomans’ involvement
in a much larger war than any previous conflicts with Russia came
at a point when the Empire’s decline was intensifying and its
future was at stake. Consequently the CUP began a preemptive
strike against the Armenians in an effort to settle its
historical problem of minority ethnicities at its borders.
Beginning in the fall of 1914, the government began a number of
tactics that provided a glimpse of its future plans for the
Armenians. They included harsh tax collection, forced
conscription, and confiscation of property in the Armenian
regions, combined with forced disarmament, assaults, and
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deportations of Armenian civilians in the extreme border
regions.66
The events of the Armenian Genocide have been cited in
countless survivor memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and diplomatic
documents. However, the decision for the mass killing and
deportations, combined with the presence of premeditated intent
by the government, is hotly debated by historians. The
destruction of CUP documents after the war and inaccessibility of
modern Ottoman archives in addition to the extreme emotion
surrounding the events and polarity among historians makes
resolution of the debate most unlikely.
The course of the Genocide began in the spring of 1915 with
a deportation order issued by the CUP for the removal of
Armenians believed to be dangerous. Orders for the deportations
were sent to local authorities in the regions, to be carried out
by security forces. The deportation decree was typically
announced to the village or city with the stated time for all
Armenians to report for removal. Armenians were allowed to carry
only a limited amount of personal belongings, forced to leave
most items behind, many of which were plundered or sold to Muslim
neighbors. Deportation orders were often accompanied by mass
killings of Armenian civilians. Mass killings were primarily
conducted by irregular Turkish gendarme units or armed Kurdish
66
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and Circassian civilians. These atrocities were heaviest in the
eastern and central regions of Anatolia and the areas of
resettlement. Men were usually separated from the women,
children, and old people, and massacre of the male population
took place earlier than that of women.67
Turkish authorities blamed the need for deportations on the
Armenian revolutionary movement, pointing to the outbreak of
violence at the city of Van as proof of Armenian rebellion.
Located near the Russian border, Van had a large Armenian
population. In the spring of 1915 Russian military forces were
advancing into Turkish territory, escalating tensions between
Armenians and the Muslim Kurds and causing the outbreak of
guerilla warfare. The Armenians claimed they were protecting
themselves from pillage, while the Porte claimed the Armenians
were trying to assist the Russians. Armenian civilians from the
city and surrounding countryside fortified the city and held off
Turkish military forces until the advance of the Russian army.68
At the same time tensions were inflaming in Van, the Porte
implemented an organized persecution of Armenian notables and
intelligentsia on April 24 in the capital. As part of an “early
phase of genocide,” by September the government had taken 140
Armenian prisoners in the capital and killed them without charges
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or a trial. The victims were mostly men from the upper class who
were well educated and included political leaders, newspaper
reporters, artists, physicians, and clerics. Recent forensic
scholarship argues that the targeting of high ranking members of
society, termed cerebrogenocide, is a marker used to label
ethnic-cleansing as a genocide. The Turkish goal was to deprive
the Armenian community of leadership, as it is clear “that the
victim’s potential leadership profile was of significance and
indeed made them the preeminent targets for genocide.”69
At the end of May 1915, the Ottoman government issued orders
to extend the geographic extent of the deportations further away
from the border regions and to include the general Armenian
population. Local Ottoman officials organized the deportations in
coordination with regulations issued by the Porte. An end date
for the deportations is hard to confirm, as deportations
continued even after decrees to end them had been issued by the
government. Local officials implementing the orders often ignored
communications to end the deportations. Certainly, they had ended
by early in 1917.70
The impact of the deportations was severe. People were given
from a few days to a few hours notice to pack or sell their
belongings. Most left all they had behind. As the male population
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was arrested or killed before being deported, the deportee
population was mostly women and children. In some cases Armenians
were forced to convert to Islam to escape death, although most
were willing to covert to save their lives, and so the policy was
abandoned by the Ottomans.71 Regions targeted for deportations
were areas where Armenians constituted more than five to ten
percent of the population, making the issue one of “Armenian
population density.”72 Those Armenians surviving the initial
massacres were made to walk to the areas of resettlement and
faced any number of devastations including starvation, rape,
kidnap, sickness, murder, and death along the way. Reports of the
death toll for the deportations varied wildly and is not
completely known. The farther the initial location was from the
point of resettlement, the worse the experience.73
Initially, as the Porte issued decrees for deportation, they
added provisions “to give the law a semblance of fair play.”74 The
government promised the Armenians they would retain ownership of
their original homes and land and even accrue rent money from
Muslims living on the land during the term of the deportation. As
part of the course of deportations, the Ottoman government also
vowed protection for the Armenians from persecution or bodily
harm. Furthermore it promised to provide assistance in rebuilding
71
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Armenian communities and homes in the new areas and to protect
the rights of property and life. The potential for the mitigation
provisions to be effective was low as the government did little
to enforce them, and Armenian deportees were rarely made aware of
the existence of such provisions. In addition, the issues of
deportation and mitigation often came after the actual
deportations and massacres had begun.75
As a result, the Armenian quality of life during the
deportations, and after, was dire. The resettlement camps for
Armenians were located in the inner provinces of the Empire, far
from the front lines. The geography of the area was arid and dry.
Starvation was a critical problem, especially after Turkey began
to experience resource shortages due to the war. The sanitary and
health conditions were deplorable, and housing was sparse. In
refuge camps in Rakka, epidemic diseases broke out, killing many
of the Armenians who had survived the deportations. In Der-elZor, the largest of the resettlement camps, the number of
Armenian deportees exceeded the prescribed ten percent in
relation to the Muslim population, resulting in thousands being
expelled to suffer further misery in additional deportations.76
The total loss of life from the deportations, whether killed
or died, and subsequent conditions is difficult to determine.
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Ottoman census procedures during its last century were
inconsistent, particularly with regards to urban versus rural
areas. The government made a larger effort to determine accurate
counts for male citizens than for females, as Muslim men in
certain age groups were considered eligible for military
conscription, and non-Muslim males were subject to the head tax.
Still the population statistics for all citizens, including
Armenians, both before and after the war are unreliable. The
counts in the desert and mountain areas, regions with large
Armenian populations, were little more than estimates, and
figures for females were vastly underestimated.77
Not only are pre-war Ottoman population figures difficult to
determine, but similarly is the exact cause of death for Armenian
civilians. Deaths could have been caused by mass killings during
the deportations, the horrific living conditions in refugee
camps, military combat, or as a result of post-war military
campaigns by Mustafa Kemal. As many as five to ten percent of
Armenian women and children converted to Islam and were
incorporated into Muslim households,78 while others relocated
overseas after the war, further complicating the issue. Lastly,
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as the debate among historians on the topic is exceptionally
polemic, an author’s bias can influence the numbers.
Despite the difficulties, many research groups and
historians have attempted to establish a number. In the most
comprehensive study to date, Dr. Sarkis Karajian created a
formula to calculate the Armenian deaths specifically related to
the Genocide. He tallied population figures for the Armenian
population in the Ottoman Empire and the Diaspora for both 1914
and 1924 and the loss of Armenian life from 1918-1922 as result
of combat or massacre. Karajian then subtracted the post-war
population figures and the loss for life from 1918-1922 from the
total pre-war population figure and concluded the total loss of
Armenian life to exceed two million.79 Yet, as recently as 2002,
studies by Turkish historians estimate the death toll at six
hundred thousand80 one of the lowest estimates thus far.
While events and conditions surrounding the deportations are
extensively documented, a fierce debate stills rages among
historians. The heart of the controversy stems from the issue of
premeditation, an element considered necessary to warrant use of
the term genocide.81 Armenians believe the CUP held pre-wartime
plans to annihilate them in an effort to cleanse Turkish society
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of non-Turks. Historians cite Young Turk nationalism, available
government documents, and diplomatic accounts from westerners to
prove the Porte had intent to exterminate the Armenians prior to
the outbreak of the war. The premeditated nature and ethnic
motivation for the deportations have led these authors to label
the event genocide.82 Vahakn Dadrian, the foremost historian
supporting the premeditation thesis, argues “evidence clearly
demonstrates that a pre-war provisional decision was already
reached radically to solve the festering Armenian question at the
first opportunity that may present itself.”83 Others supporting
this argument include Richard Hovannisian, Taner Akçam, and most
western and Armenian scholars. Conversely, Turkish historians
maintain the Armenian communities in the border regions were
engaged in treasonous activities and initiated a rebellion during
the war to hinder the Turkish war effort. Thus, the Turkish
government had no choice but to remove the Armenians from the
region to protect the country and the subsequent loss of life was
regrettable but not part of any ulterior motives.84 With the
exception of Akçam, most Turkish historians take this
perspective, and it remains the official policy of the modern
Turkish government. Of course, some historians attempt to take a
middling position, claiming the events can be labeled genocide
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due to their catastrophic impact without the presence of
premeditation.
Regardless of the presence of premeditation, the impact of
the Genocide on the Armenian people can not be overstated. They
were the community of people most affected by World War I, and
the Genocide altered the course of their entire history. The
infrastructure of the community was demolished, as displaced
Armenians all over the empire lost their homes, property, and
land, and many were left with no choice but emigration. It is
clear “the trauma of the horrendous deaths of hundreds of
thousands of people, compounded by the loss of the traditional
homelands of more than three millennia, left deep, raw wounds on
the Armenian psyche.”85
The Armenians withstood invasions and foreign control in
their ancestral homeland for centuries before the Ottomans and
always managed to rebuild and recover from any setback. Yet, a
consequence of the Genocide was the trauma of the community that
has continued into the twenty-first century.86 As Armenian
generations have passed down stories of the Genocide, it has
become engrained into the Armenian identity and consciousness.
Donald and Lorna Miller’s study on Armenians in the modern
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republic reveals that people characterize traumatic current
events involving violent discrimination as recurrences of the
Genocide.87 This aspect of the Genocide history, as part of the
Armenian identity, is one of the reasons modern Turkey and
Armenians struggle over reconciliation.
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CHAPTER 3
CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Content analysis is a widely established method of research
in social science fields. It is a method that uses systematic
procedures to classify textual material in an effort to draw out
meaning and relevance. Researchers analyze documents for themes
or ideas and compare them for patterns. Content analysis began
in the social sciences but “the impetus toward systematic
analysis of documentary data is supported by increased interest
in the analysis of textual writings in a diversity of
fields...the humanities, for instance, have become increasingly
involved in textual analysis in recent years and have developed
their own methods and concerns.”88 Traditional content analysis
methods focus on systemization and objectivity to give the study
a scientific character in which the results can be reproduced by
other researchers. Content analysis is appealing when studying
mass communication because it can accommodate large amounts of
text. Sampling procedures are often applied in content analysis
studies that deal with mass quantities of data, combined with
reliability tests to ensure accuracy.
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While the research methods of this study strive for
accuracy and reliability, they do so based on a refined
methodological procedure and academic integrity. The method of
content analysis used in this thesis is designed to specifically
suit the needs of historical inquiry. While historians do look
for patterns and trends in content, they also focus on the
context and framing of the content in an effort to examine the
big picture. Historians attempt to place examination of textual
content within its historical perspective, recognizing that
historical writings do not exist in a vacuum but rather shape
and are shaped by their contemporary backdrop.
For the purpose of conducting research on media coverage of
the Armenian Genocide, the parameters of research were limited
to make the resulting conclusions meaningful and relevant.
American media coverage was chosen for several reasons. First,
its content is in the English language, making it accessible to
the researcher and to English speaking readers wishing to verify
the conclusions. Second, American neutrality in the early years
of the war provided a unique perspective and access to
information through ongoing diplomatic relations with the
Ottoman Empire. Finally, the purpose of the research is to
develop a historical picture of American understanding and
conception of the Armenian Genocide during the war. To
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accomplish this, American media coverage was the evidence used
for analysis.
The Washington Post was chosen as a large American newspaper
located in the nation’s capital, a unique position from which the
Post might both reflect on and influence the country’s leaders
and public opinion. The Post was a daily paper by 1914, printing
editions every day of the week, including an extended Sunday
edition.
The period of study was limited to two years, from January
1, 1915 to December 31, 1916, for a number of reasons.
Historians date the Armenian Genocide to 1915. It is impossible
to conclusively date the end to the Genocide, particularly as
Turkey was not an occupied country at the end of the war and
wartime leaders remained in power in the post-war government.
The twenty-four month period selected allows for analysis of
media coverage of the earliest events in the Genocide and
continues long enough to include the variety of relevant topics
in the news coverage and time for international reaction and
response to be considered as well.
The unit for analysis in this study is the article.
Articles were analyzed in their entirety and not broken down by
word or sentence. The search for newspaper articles from the
Washington Post was conducted using one source, the archives
search engine on the Washington Post website. The words
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“Armenia” and “Armenian” were used to identify relevant
articles. All articles found were used in the research except
those having no significance, specifically articles pertaining
to the sinking of the ship Armenia.
There are two basic approaches to content analysis:
qualitative and quantitative, and the “best content-analytic
studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations on
texts.”89 Consequently this study incorporates elements of both
but relies primarily on qualitative analysis, with quantitative
analysis being a supportive approach. Content analysis requires
the use of defined categories to divide the units of analysis,
in this case the article. Categorization is done based on set
rules of procedure to ensure accuracy and reduce author bias and
subjectivity.
This content analysis centers on three major issues. The
first issue concerns the main topic displayed in articles on the
Armenian Genocide. The five main topic categories were defined
through an examination of all the articles for basic content.
Five main topics were identified: description, international
action, aid, subordinate reference, and location. Each category
has a set definition that is broad and easily recognizable in
the content of the text. The main topic of each article was
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determined using the first two paragraphs of text combined with
the headline for additional clarification. The main topic of the
each article was used to categorize it into one of the five main
topic categories. In the case of an article containing content
relevant to more than one of the five defined primary
categories, the rule of using the first two paragraphs to
determine topic was applied. Additional themes in the content
were addressed as a sub-topic, and method for sub-topic
identification is discussed below.
The description category includes all articles in which the
main topic is an account of massacres, killing, death tolls,
refugee conditions, and/or deportations. These articles can
include information on the locations of such events, the victims
and perpetrators, the way in which Americans were affected by
the massacres, and references to earlier persecutions.
A second category is international action. This category
encompasses any articles covering international or domestic
political reaction to the massacre of Armenians. It includes a
variety of topics such as Allied responses, Turkish and German
defense of the events, Armenian resistance and calls for
assistance, international diplomacy in calling others to action,
American political action in diplomacy with Turkey, and
legislation for aid.
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The third category on aid includes all articles related to
aid provided to the Armenians in forms other than military or
political assistance. It includes aid sent by or received from
all countries, although the news primarily concerns American
relief and fundraising.
The fourth category, subordinate reference, includes all
articles in which the main topic is not related to the Armenian
Genocide or the Armenian people in general. Instead, references
to the mass killing or suffering of Armenians are a sub-topic or
side note used as a reference, example, or supporting evidence
for the main topic. While the Armenian Genocide is not the main
topic in these articles, they can still provide an interesting
perspective on how the massacres were used or interpreted in
other contexts and for what political purposes or to support
which agendas. As a result, the articles’ main topics are widely
varied in this category.
The final category is location. This category is notably
smaller than others and contains articles in which the word
Armenia or Armenian is used to name a location in Asia Minor or
as an adjective to describe a geographical location. These
articles are primarily about military engagements. The articles
in this category were not discarded, as military movements often
sparked massacres and so help clarify articles in other
categories.
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The second major issue of the content analysis concerns the
sub-topics or themes present within each category. The subthemes
provide the substance of the analysis, as they examine the
content for the context, source, and framework in which the
Armenian Genocide was presented to Americans. This phase of the
content analysis took place after the articles had been sorted
into one of the five main topic categories, during which the
articles within each category were then analyzed for internal
themes. Within the main topic category, an article can have many
subthemes and is not divided into only one category. Sub-topics
are divisions of the story or supporting points within the story
and can be noted when a change of idea or information occurs in
the text. Within each main topic category, a series of questions
were asked of all the articles to determine subthemes and
facilitate analysis. The following questions were asked:
•

What reoccurring themes appear in multiple articles?

•

Are there any shared sources in multiple articles?

•

What kind of language is used to report the Genocide?

The third major issue addressed in the content analysis
was the prominence of coverage the Post gave to the Armenian
Genocide and was determined using a quantitative approach. The
rational for measuring placement of stories is to determine
visibility, and quantity of articles is for comparison between
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main topic categories.

The following indicators are used to

measure prominence:
•

total number of stories

•

number of stories beginning on page one

•

number of front page, headline articles

•

number of stories based on day of the week, month, and
year

•

number of articles reported from foreign countries

These indicators were applied to counts based on the total
number of articles and the articles within each main topic
category. The results of this analysis are displayed in the text
of the analysis and also represented in table form. Results from
the quantitative analysis provide information on which category
received the most coverage, when the media coverage in a
particular category was the highest, and how any trends arise
from the dates and days of media coverage. Measurement
concerning the country of origin for news sources also reveals
any reliance on a country or side in the war for information.
Other methods of measuring prominence commonly employed in
content analysis were considered but discarded as impractical
for this study. One such method was the use of word count. Word
count can be used to as an indicator of prominence, with the
length of an article indicative of its important. The topics of

60

longer articles receive more coverage, and so play a larger role
in shaping public opinion. While this point is valid, the use of
word count as a tool for this study was deemed unfeasible due to
discrepancies between the Washington Post’s report of word count
for articles as compared to researcher verification in the text.
The following are the results of the content analysis
study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH RESULTS

Qualitative Analysis

Description
This category includes articles in which the main topic is
a description of the mass killings and deportations Armenians.
This category is placed first because knowledge and details of
the massacres themselves are crucial as a basis for
understanding all further action regarding the Armenians. For
Americans, the way media coverage portrayed the events, the
vocabulary used, amount of detail provided, and placement of
blame created the foundation for immediate and future opinion,
emotion about the massacres and opinion of Turkey.
The description category contains a total of forty-nine
articles, out of one hundred eighty total, thirty-seven in 1915
and twelve in 1916. The very first article in January 1915 falls
under this category and the bulk of the articles in this
category were printed between April 1915 and February 1916. The
largest number of descriptive articles appeared in August 1915,
with a total of eight, in a month of fifteen total articles. Of
all five categories, the description group is the first theme to
arise in the media coverage, and is heaviest in the mid and late
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months of 1915, tapering off by mid 1916. Nine of the forty-nine
articles appear on the front page and three appear as headline
stories. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).
Before beginning an analysis of the many different subtopic themes contained in the description category, it is first
necessary to address the core content, the actual descriptions.
Media coverage with descriptions of the massacre of Armenians
and conditions of refuges was some of the most graphic of all
the articles surveyed and understandably provoked emotion and
instigated much of the coverage to follow in other categories.
First hand stories and accounts of the killing, pillaging, and
treatment of Armenians in Turkey during World War I is perhaps
the least controversial aspect of the Genocide, as it is so well
documented and collaborated. Articles in the Washington Post are
comparable in content to eyewitness accounts from other sources
on the events.
Article titles in this category provided the first glimpse
of the content to follow. Headlines such as “50 Tied and
Drowned”, “Greatest Horrors in History,” and “Starving
Armenians,” gave readers a glimpse of the content of the article
and made it clear the topic of the article was coverage of the
massacres. Provoking headlines might as also have been a ploy to
drawn readers in and gain a shock factor. Descriptive articles
reported on the massacre of Armenians “who were led out into the
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street, where they were either shot or their throats cut”90 or
gave vivid descriptions of death such as, “the plain of
Alashgerd is virtually covered with the bodies of men, women and
children.”91 Other examples included accounts of “throwing the
bodies of the victims into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers,”92
“corpses of noncombatants, both men and women, strewn along
every trail,”93 and wells “in which the bodies of the dead had
been crammed.”94 They used phrases like “general”, “systematic”,
“organized”,
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“annihilation”, and “extermination”96 to describe

the massacre of Armenians.
While descriptive quotes about the massacres are endless,
simple descriptions have limits. Stand alone descriptions about
the massacres can not reveal the motivations of the author,
assign responsibility for the massacres, determine causes and
effect of the events, or the source of the information.
Descriptions are much more relevant when read and understood
within the context of the article. Key themes to identify in
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articles with descriptions are the kind of vocabulary used,
other information provided in proximity to the descriptions, and
if the article provided coverage on reactions to the massacres.
Articles in the description category are unique from those
in other categories in that they often included a source for
their information such as an eyewitness. Identification of a
source for the information made the news more reliable or
creditable. In some cases the article referred to a
correspondent reporting the news97 with little other information,
making the nationality or reliability difficult to determine.
The most common type of source used was an eyewitness, in most
cases a refugee. In “Turks Kill Christians” and “Moslems Slay
People in Ten Villages” unnamed refugees in Persia and Russia
reported the massacre of Armenians and looting of towns around
Lake Van.98 In instances where the refugee’s name is known, it
was reported, as in the case of Dr. Kochadur Bonaparian, an
Armenian refugee in Russia who reported the spread of disease
and the fate of American missionaries in Armenia.99 As refugees
were the victims of the offenses, they could have potential bias
in reporting the events. They could exaggerate the crimes or
death toll to embarrass Turkey or compel assistance from Russia
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and other Allied countries. Also the refugees primarily fled to
Russia or Persia, two locations under Allied control. News
coming out of Allied countries could have been biased based on
wartime alliances and ulterior motives on the part of the Allies
to portray Turkey as evil in an effort to draw the United States
into the war on their side.
American missionaries were also the source of large amounts
of eyewitness coverage. The area of Lake Van was the location of
conflict between the Russian and Turkish armies, and a siege was
fought for the city when Armenian guerilla forces fortified the
city to wait for the arrival of the Russians. The city housed an
American mission and school, so missionaries witnessed fighting
and persecutions in the area. Missionaries were a source of
information on the events and considered reliable sources of
information, as they were American and so not likely to be
clouded by national bias. In October 1915 sixteen missionaries
arrived in the United States after serving in Turkey. An article
recounted how they sheltered Armenians from Turks and Kurds and
the terrible conditions in Armenia.100 In another instance an
anonymous female missionary who escaped to Cairo submitted a
report describing the situation in Turkey. She recounted the
conditions of deported Armenians on their way to Syria, the
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enslavement of women for Turkish harems, her own attempts to
covertly provide aid for refugees, and imprisonment of other
missionaries.101
Missionaries not only provided information for reports but
also gave public speeches. A story in October 1915 covered a
speech by returned missionary Dr. Henry Barnum, who spoke at a
church service of the killing of Christians by Muslims. He
advocated continued support of the foreign missions board’s work
in Turkey.102 American missionaries were considered reliable
sources as they had worked in Turkey for decades. They knew the
people and the country, had established contacts and were
considered authorities on the subject. In addition, missionaries
provided the opportunity for American sources of information,
that were not filtered through international outlets and
correspondents.
Eyewitness accounts were not only filtered through
international media outlets but also by international and
domestic committees and organizations. The American Committee
for Armenian and Syrian Relief, the Armenian Red Cross Fund in
London, and the Armenian General Progressive Association in the
United States disseminated information they received in reports.
Relief organizations prepared press releases and made statements
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to inform the public about the events and conditions in Armenia.
In some cases, the articles told how the organization received
its information, such as an eyewitness or religious spokesperson
as was the case with the Katholikos, head of the Armenian
Church.103
Reliability of sources and the information they provided
was clearly an issue, as some reports attempted to demonstrate
the validity of their information. In an article on an account
of the atrocities in Armenia complied by an American committee
with interests in Turkey, the committee began the report by
emphasizing the integrity and authority of the writers and the
large amounts of information gathered from informed sources on
the topic.104 In another case, the American Committee on Armenian
and Syrian Relief prefaced its publicized report by stating
information came through a “high diplomatic authority in Turkey,
not American, reporting the testimony of trustworthy witnesses
over wide areas.”105
Now that different types of sources and source biases have
been discussed, the various sub-topic themes presented within
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this category will be discussed. There are six sub-topic themes
in the description category: the correlation between military
engagement and Armenian massacres, perpetrators of the
persecutions, the use of religious terminology, references to
pre-war massacres, the presence of Americans in Armenia, and
retaliatory action by Armenians.
The first theme is the correlation between Turkish and
Russian military engagements and the massacre of Armenians.
Several articles specifically state the two events were related,
of that one premeditated the other. In one of the earliest
articles printed in 1915, a special cable reported murders of
Armenians in Tiflis escalated after news of Russian occupation
of Ardahan. The initial death toll of fifteen rose to one
hundred fifty in a “systematic massacre” in retaliation after
the news of Russian military success.106 Two later stories made
reference to massacres and pillaging of villages that occurred
prior to the evacuation of Turks in anticipation of the arrival
of Russian forces.107 A final article told of Russian military
successes in Caucasus and the spread of Turkish destruction of
Armenian homes in the area.108 While Russian military success in
Armenia was by no means the source of tension between Armenians
106
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and Muslims, the articles show that at times military movements
served as a catalyst to provoke or increase the severity of
persecutions.
The second sub-topic theme concerns the perpetrators of the
persecutions. Most of the articles that name perpetrators in the
massacres cite Turks, Kurds, or both. If not clearly stated, it
is unclear whether the term “Turk” refers to Turkish troops,
gendarmes, or members of the civilian population. Some articles
provided exact information, such as one in April 1915 that
reported Turkish troops with the help of local Turkish police
massacred Armenians and killed any who escaped the first
round.109 An article only a few weeks later reported Armenians
attempts to defend themselves against the Kurds, but “the Kurds
were aided by Turkish regulars.”110 A similar story said “Turks
distributed 40,000 rifles among Kurds in Mush Valley for use
against Armenians.”111
Vague references to Turkish perpetrators without
identification of military status created a conception of the
“Turk” as a homogenous entity, wholly capable of violent
discrimination. Articles that reported persecution by Turkish
regular troops and police or the distribution of weapons with
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the intent of killing Armenians implies organization,
preplanning, and orders from a higher authority.
Some articles actually cited orders for the massacres or
directly blamed the Turkish government. An article in March 1915
said in the cities of Salmaz, Pagaduk, and Sarna the Turkish
commissioner gave orders for the “destruction of the towns.”112
Two other stories blamed the government directly, saying it
ordered the deportation of the Armenians and used it as cover to
commit rape, murder, and pillage. One in particular directly
stated the persecutions were “not in response to fanatical or
popular demand, but is purely arbitrary, and directed from
Constantinople.”113
One of the major controversies in the historiography of the
Armenian Genocide is the role of the Committee of Union and
Progress as the invisible hand instigating the massacres. Some
historians argue the CUP secretly ordered wide scale mass
killing of Armenians, while other historians argue massacres
spontaneously ignited as a result of inter-communal rivalry. In
these cases there is also controversy concerning who carried out
the massacres, civilian Kurds or Turkish troops, the latter of
which would imply orders from the government. While Washington
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Post news articles can not necessarily be considered reliable
sources for solving this controversy, contemporary coverage on
the identity of the perpetrators can clarify how Americans
understood the events and any deep rooted stereotypes created
based on the media coverage.
Another significant sub-topic theme present in articles in
this category is the use of religious vocabulary to describe the
events. While the terms “Christian” and “Muslim” were commonly
used interchangeably with “Armenian” and “Turk,” other types of
religious terminology were employed to provide context to the
reader and associate Armenian with good and Turk with bad. Two
articles both created similar parallels between the Jews’ escape
from Egypt in the Bible and Armenian refugees’ flight from
Turkey. Armenian and Nestorian Christian refugees’ journey to
Persia was called an “exodus” in an article in April 1915 and in
another, a narrative about an American missionary labeled him a
“modern day Moses” who “shepherded his enormous flock out of the
Armenian province of Van.”114 In another report, a pastor was
equated to a “savior” and credited with leading “his” Armenians
to the safety of Russia’s western civilization, just barely
escaping the advancing Turks.115
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In an story covering a speech by a retuned American
missionary at the Ingram Memorial Church service in October
1915, the speaker, Dr. Branum, cloaked his account of the
massacre of Armenians in strong religious language. He claimed
Turks killed Armenians because they were Christian and refused
to convert to Islam. He stated the Turks felt it was their
mission to rid the world of unbelievers.116
The religious language used in descriptions of the
massacres was not extensive, but it is worth noting as a context
through which American readers learned and understood the
Armenian Genocide. Referring to refugees’ journey as an exodus
correlates it to the Jewish journey leaving Egypt and connects
the Armenians symbolically to God’s chosen people, making them
worthy of protection. It also drew a correlation between the
Turks and the Egyptians as the enslavers and the villains. With
this language, the centuries old, complex relationship between
the Turks and Armenians was simplified into clearly
distinguishable roles. The theme of an American serving as Moses
to lead the Armenians to safety is similarly telling. It placed
America in the role of savior to the Armenians and assigned it
the responsibility to free the Armenians from Turkey. It
provides perspective for how Americans may have viewed their
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relationship and duty to the Armenians and their role as a
player in the larger global conflict.
A handful of articles mentioned previous persecutions of
Armenians in Turkey, primarily the 1894-1896 massacres under
Sultan Abdul Hamid II. A story early in 1915 referred to the
1894-1896 massacres and expressed fear that the current events
might become a repeat of the previous century. It claimed the
“Young Turks have adopted the policy pursued by Abdul Hamid that
year, namely the annihilation of the Armenians.”117 Articles from
British news sources, quoting letters from a diplomatic
representative of the Armenian Katholikos, said that the modern
massacres far surpassed any occurring under Abdul Hamid II.118
Articles that refer to earlier massacres provide several
perspectives. First they take the Genocide out of the context of
the global war and put it into the context of the historical
tension between Turks and Armenians. In doing so, it showed
continuity in the animosity that stemmed from deep rooted
conflicts. It also portrayed the Turks as inherently evil and as
not merely retaliating against a situation created by the
contemporary conflict. Comparisons to prior massacres also
provided a reference point to gage the severity of the current
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persecutions and to emphasize the great need for intervention
and aid.
By far the largest sub-topic theme in this category is the
presence and safety of Americans in Armenia. As already noted,
American missionaries in Armenia provided many eyewitness
accounts of the Armenian massacres. In addition to articles
attributing information to American sources, much of the news
coverage focused on the safety of Americans working in Turkey
and their ability to safely escape. Coverage in mid-1915
reported Americans in Armenia were safe and did not fear
persecution as they were “regarded as neutral and not likely to
be attacked.”119 Yet, as the Russian army moved further into
Armenia toward the city of Van, where a large American mission
was located, reports appeared of threats to American safety.
Just days after the first story, the Washington Post reported
American missionaries in Van were “in grave danger”120 as Turk and
Kurdish forces besieged the city. In other cities, the news
reported Americans had to flee and abandon their missions.121
Fear for the safety of Americans became a diplomatic issue, as a
story two days later reported that the Grand Vizier of Turkey
issued an order to the governor of Van in the presence of
Ambassador Morgenthau to protect Americans in the city and
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American interests throughout Turkey.122 In August 1915, two
articles reported that the American missionaries in Van had
escaped the country and reached safety with the exception of one
who died.123
Other articles concerning Americans in Turkey referred to
an American who provided aid to persecuted Armenians. In one
instance, Americans attempted to hide Armenian children by
concealing them in schools, only to have them taken away and
given to Muslim families.124 Others tell of American missionaries
in Van who sheltered Armenian women and children during the
attack on the city or missionaries at Urumiah who were forced to
pay “$40,000 as a ransom for refugees who had fled to the
mission for protection.”125
Two articles concerning the safely of Americans appear on
the front page, each in a headline story, emphasizing the
importance of the topic. In an article on April 29, 1915, the
headline reads “Crucified by Turks.” Missionaries reported the
killing of native Christians in Persia, some by crucifixion. A
lesser headline in the article read “Turks Attack Americans” and
reported Turks attacked an American and French Roman Catholic
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Mission in Urumiah and took five Russian priests hostage.126 The
second headline article reported the death of a U.S citizen in
Urfa. Few details were given, only that the American died by
poisoning and had been working to disperse funds allocated for
refugees.127 The prominent placement of articles concerning
Americans emphasized the importance of the issue and a focus on
Americans as a source of protection to refugees. It also further
enforced the image of the evil Turk, who attacked Americans,
making him a natural enemy of America. With America portrayed as
an enemy of Turkey, it conversely implied she was natural ally
of the Entente nations.
While the vast majority of the articles in this category
describe persecutions against the Armenians, three describe
retaliatory actions on the part of Armenians against Kurds and
Turks, the final sub-topic theme. In October 1915 and again in
February 1916, two stories told of Armenians looting Turkish
homes and killing fleeing troops. After the Turkish retreat in
Van, Armenians in hiding came out to “duplicate the atrocities
that had previously been practiced upon Armenians.”128 Similarly,
when Turkish forces fled from Erzerum in advance of Russian
troops, Armenians massacred Turkish troops and began helping the
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approaching Russians129. In both articles, the headlines directly
reflected the main topic of the Armenian actions, and each
article qualified the information to say the Armenian action was
retaliatory against similar actions committed against them.
While these articles are few, they are noteworthy as they show
Americans had knowledge of atrocities committed by Armenians,
and that the persecutions were not only the one-sided slaughter
of a single ethnic group.
Similar acts of retaliation were described in a unique
article detailing an official report issued by the Ottoman
government in October 1915. In the report, the Ottoman
government claimed many atrocities were committed against Turks
by Greeks and Armenians who cooperated with Russian forces. The
article recounted ten examples of such atrocities and
specifically said it omitted some of the graphic details. The
report contained details of rape, suicide, battery, murder,
massacre, and dismemberment crimes committed against Turks.130 It
is clear from this article, and the official Turkish report,
that Turkey made an effort to justify its persecution of the
Armenians and claimed the sovereign right to defend its citizens
against similar acts.
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The description category is crucial to understand the types
of vivid details Americans read about the massacre of Armenians.
Any type of public outcry, international diplomacy, or relief
efforts were a response to the severity of Armenian suffering,
which was communicated to the American people in part by the
media. Graphic accounts of murder, starvation, and pillage made
Americans aware of the plight of Armenian refugees. Religious
vocabulary defined the symbolic relationship of the Turks and
the Armenians and portrayed America as a savior of the Armenian
people. The Muslim Turks and Kurds were continuously named as
the perpetrators of violent persecution, and all stories on
Armenian retaliation qualified it as justifiable self-defense.
Discussion of Armenian massacres from the previous century
served to weaken Turkish claims of deportations for national
security by demonstrating a historical hatred of the Armenians.
The most prominent theme of the safely and importance of
Americans in Turkey illustrated American concern over the fate
of its own citizens at the hands of the Turks and associated
Turkey as an enemy to the United States.

International Action
The international action category is comprised of articles
covering reaction or dialogue from around the world concerning
the Armenian persecutions. It is the most widely varied
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category, with many subthemes. They range from United States and
international political action, accusations of blame, and
appeals for aid. Overall, the articles in this category tend to
be longer than those in other categories and more often contain
excerpts of articles from international newspapers. There are
four sub-topic themes: United State diplomacy, international
appeals to the United States, Turkish diplomacy concerning the
Armenians, and German political action concerning the Armenians.
This category contains fifty-six articles, more than any
other category. Thirty of the articles were printed in 1915 and
twenty in 1916. They are concentrated in the fall and winter
months of 1915 and very early in 1916. They then taper off until
a slight resurgence in the summer of 1916. The articles in this
category are reactionary to the descriptive coverage of the
massacres, and so they peak drastically just two months after
the concentration of articles in the description category. The
month with the highest number of articles is October 1915, when
twelve were printed. The international action category has five
front page articles and one headline story. (Refer to Table 2
and Table 6).
The first and largest theme in this category is on the
topic of United States diplomacy. Starting in April 1915, the
Post began reporting on American communication with Turkey
regarding the massacres. Articles reported the United States
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sent appeals to Turkey through Ambassador Henry Morgenthau to
protect Armenians and prevent “religious outbreaks.”131 Articles
reporting similar appeals continued in May, September, and
October 1915 and on into February 1916. The stories reveal a
continuity in the United States approach to diplomacy with
Turkey. Similar to the first appeal sent in April, news reports
said Morgenthau was directed to “take the matter up,” “inquire
into reported outrages,” “inform the Turkish minister of foreign
affairs” as to negative American sentiment, and “present a
protest, which is in effect a warning” to the Ottoman government
of United States displeasure.132 As late as July 1916, over a
year after the first information on United States diplomatic
communication with Turkey, an article reported that the news of
more severe atrocities against Armenians had “led the State
Department to consider making new representations to the
Porte.”133
Not only do these articles reveal the lukewarm tone of
American policy, some articles mention that American
representations to the Porte did not “threaten a break in
diplomatic relations”, but rather “unless the massacres ceased
friendly relations between the American people and the people of
131
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Turkey would be threatened.”134 Additional articles reaffirmed
this policy and further reported that “the United States could
not take official action in a mater involving the treatment by a
government of its own nationals, and could only take cognizance
of the situation on the grounds of justice and humanity.”135 It
was not until December 1916 that an article reveals a shift in
American policy. Entitled “U.S. Turns on Turkey,” it said the
State Department would delay in confirming the new Turkish
ambassador until the United States received a reply from Turkey
on past representations.136
While the Post is not persuasive as a legitimate source on
American foreign policy toward Turkey in these years, it is
useful as an indicator of the type of information presented to
Americans on U.S. policy regarding the Armenian Genocide. It can
also provide evidence as to American’s reaction to the policy
and news on the massacres. In May 1915, an article reporting on
American diplomacy noted the State Department had received “a
flood of communications from various parts of the country,”
pushing for the government to help Armenians in Turkey.137
Additional articles named American public sentiment as the
motivation for representations to the Ottoman government and
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stated the “American people have been deeply stirred by the fate
of the Christians ruthlessly slaughtered in Armenia.”138
References to American public opinion calling for action reveals
a reaction to the news of the massacres provided in articles
containing descriptions. They also reveal a motive on the part
of the United States government to use that public opinion to
threaten Turkey with possible deterioration of relations. At a
time when the United States was still a neutral country,
strained relations could escalate if the United States entered
the war on the side of the Allies.
A second trend in the articles in this category is
international appeals to the United States to help the Armenians
or convey messages between nations. America’s status as a
neutral country made it especially attractive as an intermediary
between the Allied and the Central Powers. It also gave the
United States more access to information concerning the
Armenians, which she could in turn share with the Allied
countries. The first article covering American communication to
the Porte over the Armenian persecutions cited a request from
the Russian government as the impetus for America taking action.
Severed relations between Russia and Turkey prevented
negotiations between the two, so Russia turned to the United
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States. Included in the Russian request was a message from the
head of the Armenian Catholic church to President Wilson asking
for aid.139
The majority of appeals for aid from the United States came
from Great Britain. Viscount Bryce, former ambassador to the
United States, was a vocal proponent of United States action.
Three articles in September 1915, January and February 1916
reported on Bryce’s appeals for US action. He called on the
neutral nations, “especially America,” to use their influence on
Turkey to stop the horrors and persuade Germany to reprimand the
Porte.140 Later articles report he directly asked the United
States government to send relief to the Armenians.141
Further appeals came in stories quoting British sources:
the chairman of the British Armenia committee and the minister
of At. Augustine’s Edgbaston. Two additional stories were
reprinted from British newspapers. In one, America was named the
“important neutral,” and all the stories reiterated the claim
that American pressure on Germany could stop the massacres.142
Similar to the articles on Viscount Bryce, they contained
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descriptive information on the massacres in an effort to connect
the reality of the horror directly to appeals for action.
Another trend within the international action category is
Ottoman diplomacy involving the massacre of Armenians. Beginning
in August 1915, a series of articles presented random and
inconsistent information about Turkish politics on the Armenian
issue. The first such article hinted at conflict in the Turkish
cabinet over the issue of the Armenian Genocide. It reported,
the “grand vizier, according to one correspondent, had
threatened to resign unless the reported treatment of Greeks and
Armenians ceases.”143 Two months later, an article reported that
Turkey made clear to the United States government that “she will
not permit interference by any foreign power of her so-called
‘Armenian policy’”.144 Then only five days later, the Washington
Post printed news out of Constantinople that the Porte had
thrown an “impenetrable veil over its action toward all
Armenians,” in light of public disapproval on the Armenian
policy from the Turkish upper classes who “favor a policy of
conciliation, and some of who even go as far as to advocate the
establishment of a separate Armenian state”.145 Contradictory
information about the political mood in Turkey attested to the
limited and unreliable sources but also to the volatile mood in
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the country as the Porte faced an advancing Russian army and
fluctuating public opinion on the Armenian persecutions.
Also in October 1915, articles on Turkish political action
began to shift toward a theme of Turkish justification of their
actions, calling them reactionary to Armenian rebellion. An
article announcing the appointment of Halil Bey to the Ottoman
cabinet contained an interview in which he claimed the Armenians
were “traitors” who conspired with the Russian army in the
attack on Van.146 Continuing with this theme, two articles out of
Berlin in February 1916 reported on the publication of a Turkish
White Book on the mass killing of Armenians. The book identified
a historical conflict between the Ottoman government and the
Armenians in which the latter continuously sought international
protection from Russia and Great Britain. At the outbreak of the
war, the “Armenians shrank from no sacrifice in furtherance of
the entente’s military operations.”147
The final sub-topic theme is German political action
concerning the Armenians. There are nine articles that contain
this theme, all of which were published in a five month period
from September 1915 to January 1916. They fall into two almost
equal sections: articles in which the Germans defend Turkish
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actions against the Armenians, and articles in which Germany
protests the massacres.
The articles in which Germany supports the Turkish
persecutions of Armenians claimed that the Armenians were
seditious and gave assistance to the Russians. In “Uphold
Turkish Acts,” the article reported that Turkish actions to deal
with the Armenian uprisings were “an internal affair which
concerns him alone.”148 Similarly, an article in the same month,
containing excerpts from a German newspapers, said the
“oppressive measures the Ottoman government found itself
compelled to adopt against it Armenians subjects” were a “war
measure,” and that the British press was exaggerating the state
of conditions in Armenia.149 German sources also used a tactic of
identifying atrocities committed by the Allies in India,
Ireland, Poland, and the Boer War to combat Allied condemnation
of the mass killing of Armenians.150 In the most extreme defense
of Turkey, one article quoted a letter publicized by the German
ambassador in which he called the alleged atrocities “pure
invention,” and said the reports from the Armenian catholicos
were only written under pressure from Russia.151
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In an opposite approach, some articles reported on German
attempts to halt the Turkish persecution of Armenians. Three
articles ranging from October 1915 to December 1915 all made
almost identical reports. They claimed the German ambassador in
Turkey submitted a protest on behalf of the German government on
the subject of Armenian massacres to the Turkish foreign office.
The articled cited both Ambassador Morgenthau and James Barton
of the American Committee on Armenian and Syrian Relief as
corroborating sources that confirm the existence of such a
protest.152 In a comparable story, a German diplomat representing
the German Emperor publicized a statement, stating Germany holds
the protection of Christians in Turkey as a high priority and
would take measure to uphold its responsibility.153
One lone article presented a vague view of the German
diplomatic position. It contained an excerpt of the reply from a
political leader in the German foreign office on the topic of
the Armenians. It said the Turkish government was compelled to
action by seditious intrigues on the part of the Armenians. It
further stated the Turkish and Germans governments were
participating in an “interchange of ideas” on the subject, yet

152

“Armenian Issue Vague,” Washington Post, October 10, 1915, ES 16;
“U.S to Aid Armenians,” Washington Post, October 5, 1915, 1; “Germans Defend
Armenians,” December 23, 1915, 2.
153
“Try to Save Christians,” Washington Post, December 12, 1915, 20.

88

the story was unclear as to the type of position Germany had on
the massacres.154

Aid
The category on aid includes all articles that report on
pleas for aid to the Armenians from any source, civilian efforts
to raise money or supplies, and domestic political action to
support civilian relief efforts. There are five identified subtopics in this category: pleas for aid, domestic political
action, the role of private organizations, international
diplomacy, and civilian relief efforts. All of the sub-topics
are present in more than four articles.
The aid category includes twenty-nine articles total, seven
in 1915 and twenty-two in 1916. The bulk of articles on aid were
published in the fall of 1916, with thirteen in October 1916.
Aid articles are heaviest toward the end of the twenty-four
month period examined, coming after articles describing the
massacres and international actions. The aid category has two
front page articles, the same as the location category, and the
fewest. Of the two front page stories, one is a headline
article. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).
The first sub-topic theme concerns pleas for aid. The first
articles containing pleas for aid to the Armenians came in June
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1915. They stories reported dire circumstances in Van, due to
limited medical supplies and personnel and told of Armenians
hiding in American buildings. In both, American missionaries in
Van begged for urgent assistance.155 Further articles with pleas
for aid came in the fall of 1915, the first from Lord Bryce of
Great Britain. Bryce communicated with a private relief
organization urging American humanity to respond with
assistance.156 A second report in October contained a letter to
the newspaper from the wife of an Armenian. In it, she lamented
the woeful situation of the Armenians and urged America to do
its duty to the Armenians.157
A second sub-topic theme is domestic political action on
relief efforts. While articles covering international action and
diplomacy were discussed in the last main topic category, this
sub-topic theme deals only with political action directly
related to relief efforts. The first instance came through
multiple reports of attempts by Ambassador Morgenthau to provide
relief for Armenians and negotiations to bring Armenian refugees
to the Untied States. Two articles in September and October 1915
reported that Morgenthau offered the Turkish government money to
transport Armenians to America, where they “would make good
155
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citizens to settle the less thickly populated parts of the
Western States.”158 The articles reported Morgenthau offered one
million dollars of his own money and promised to raise four
million dollars more as part of the plan and that the Turkish
government accepted the offer.159
Early articles in this category show that the United States
government took a hands-off approach to orchestrating Armenian
relief efforts. A September 1915 story reported that all efforts
to raise relief for Armenians will be on the part of private
organization without United States government assistance, as the
Turkish government had threatened against interference. Private
organizations were preparing to launch a nation-wide appeal for
relief with information provided my Morgenthau on the
massacres.160
Still later articles reveal a slight shift in the
government’s policy. Private relief organizations encountered
difficulties in transporting supplies to Turkey and turned to
the government for assistance. Reports beginning only a month
later told of collaboration with the United States Navy in
sending material supplies and possible transportation of
refugees back to America. Almost a full year later, in October
158
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1916, similar articles described further attempts for
collaboration between the United States Navy and private relief
organizations. The first article reported the Navy denied a
request for a battleship to transport supplies to Armenia, but
two weeks later an article informed that the Navy approved space
on a collier for supplies.161 While the United States government
did not participate in the collection or distribution of
supplies, the articles show cooperation on the part of the
government in the relief effort.
Two more articles in 1916 show a much more direct political
action. The first in February covered a political partisan clash
between two United Sate Senators during discussions over a
resolution. Senator Lodge proposed a resolution requesting
President Wilson name a day for public relief collections to aid
Armenians.162 An article the following September reported the
success of the resolution, saying it passed Congress and
consequently President Wilson issued two proclamations. They
appointed specific relief days for private contributions to aid
Armenians and Lithuanians to be collected by private relief
organizations.163
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This sub-topic is small, due to the limited amount of
government action regarding aid for the Armenians. While United
States political action for the Armenians on a diplomatic level
is discussed in a different category, this sub-topic shows the
United States government did very little to contribute to relief
effort for Armenians; one article even reported the State
Department would respect Turkey’s policy of non-interference.
The only real sign of government participation was through the
Navy Department’s transportations of supplies, and that only
occurred after massive efforts on the part of private
organizations.
A third sub-topic theme in this category concerns the role
of private organizations in the relief effort. It is a large
theme reflecting the prominent position they played in raising
money, supplies, and interest for the Armenians. None of the
articles in this sub-topic theme reported on the committees
themselves, but rather the committees are referenced for their
role in the raising funds and organizing collections. All of the
articles reflect the prominent role private organizations played
in raising money and coordinating the logistics of
transportation and distribution of supplies in Turkey.
Several organizations are mentioned by name in these
articles including the Red Cross, Armenian Atrocities Committee,
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, and Armenian
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and Syrian colonies of Washington. All but one of the articles
were printed in 1916, with the first reporting on the initial
funds being forwarded to Morgenthau for refugees.164 The rest of
the articles were published in the fall 1916, primarily
regarding a nation-wide relief day to raise money for the
Armenians. While the government issued a proclamation
designating a relief day, private organizations were responsible
for its implementation. Both the Red Cross and the American
Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief took a large role in
organizing the collections of goods. Several articles mentioned
meetings in Washington, D.C. to arrange locations and volunteers
to collect goods.165
A fourth sub-topic theme is diplomacy in the relief effort.
As previously mentioned, private relief organizations dealt with
the logistics of transporting and distributing supplies, at
times in collaboration with the United States Navy. Negotiating
the distribution of supplies in Turkey was the responsibility of
the State Department and so required government action. Three
articles in September and October 1916 reported on the struggles
in gaining Turkish acceptance of relief aid to refugees. In
September Turkey overturned its early decision to deny shipments
164
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of aid, at first saying they were not necessary. Instead Turkey
allowed distribution of supplies, provided it took place in the
port of Beirut through the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.
The Turkish government did not allow for distribution in
Armenia.166
Diplomatic negotiations concerning aid also extended to the
Allies, as the United States needed permission to cross the
Allied naval blockade to deliver the supplies. One article
mentioned hope for Allied cooperation “as the French government
has been anxious to get such supplies through and may itself
contribute.”167 Days later a similar story reported the Allies
accepted the proposal and agreed to allow relief supplies to
pass through the blockade.168 Diplomacy issues in delivering aid
required team work between private organizations and the United
States government.
The final sub-topic theme is civilian relief efforts.
Civilian relief efforts are similar to the role of private
organizations in that it does not pertain to political action
and the government’s role. Civilian efforts include articles on
people giving to the relief effort, working as volunteers and as
part of religious organizations in promoting the cause of the
Armenians. Articles including this theme mainly reported on the
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events of the Armenian Relief Day ordered by the government. It
took place in October 1916, the same month when the majority of
articles in the aid category were printed.
For three weeks leading up to the Armenian Relief Days on
October 21 and 22, the Post printed seven articles detailing the
plans to raise funds in the Washington, D.C. area. Religious
organizations were instrumental in assembling volunteers and
publicizing the need for contribution. Ministers from four large
churches vowed to preach on the need for assistance to the
Armenians. They also asked for businessmen to offer space in
their place of business for booths and female volunteers to work
at collection booths to accept donated items and money. Some
churches also took up a special collection on October 22 or
donated all the money collected during service.169
Social status was an element of the relief efforts as
volunteerism was considered acceptable for upper class women.
The Post headlines read “Society Girls in War Effort” and
reports paid special attention to the “girls and matrons”
volunteering for service. Multiple articles name the women in
charge of the plans and two articles give the full names of
every female volunteer, along with her address.170
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Articles reporting on the events of the Armenian Relief
Days reflect a localized view of the relief efforts. Stories
center on the work of local churches and community members with
little attention to nation-wide efforts. Several articles name
the churches and businesses who participated in collecting money
and tallies from the local organizations on the amount of funds
received.171 Only one article mentioned the larger relief
efforts, saying the “Capital held its own with other
metropolitan centers and substantial sums were collected on the
day set aside by President Wilson as Armenian relief day,”
although it did not include a source or any further
information.172

Subordinate Reference
The subordinate reference category is one of the most
widely varied categories. It includes all articles in which the
main topic of the story is not related the Armenian Genocide or
the Armenian people. Instead, mention of the Armenians comprises
a minor sub-note within the article, in some cases only a single
sentence or phrase. In this category, reference to the Armenians
was only a small component in the overall topic of the article,
and the Armenians were used as supporting evidence in an
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argument or as an example of one group out of many affected by
the war. As the main topics of the articles in this category
vary so widely, it contains fewer shared sub-topic themes. There
are four themes: international plans for the future of the
Armenians, the massacre of Armenians as supporting evidence for
ulterior agendas, correlations between the Armenians and
military affairs, and Armenians in the context of the political
climate in Turkey.
The subordinate reference category has a total of thirtysix articles, nineteen in 1915 and seventeen in 1916.
Publication of the articles was as sporadic as the main topics.
The articles are present in seventeen of the twenty-four months
surveyed, with August 1915 and December 1916 sharing the highest
number of five articles. There are few trends in a publication
of subordinate reference articles, the most revealing trend
being front page and headline articles. This category has nine
front page articles, all of which are headline articles, located
above the fold, making it the most conspicuous of all the
categories. While the articles’ main topics vary, it is clear
from their prominent placement that the Armenians made it into
more headline articles as a side note than as the main topic.
(Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).
The first sub-topic theme in this category is international
plans for the future of the Armenians. Four articles included
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reference to discussions or plans for the future of Armenia. Two
articles, the first in April 1915 and the second in December
1916, are similar in that they reported on international
agreements between the Entente Powers. The front page, headline
articles in April entitled “Sees End of Turkey,” covered a
written agreement between France, Great Britain, and Russia. The
agreement conceded the future dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
and proposed an autonomous Armenia “under the suzerainty of
Russia.”173 Similarly, an article over a year later told of a
reply by the Entente Powers to a communication from Germany. In
it the Allies proposed peace terms that included a Russian
sphere of influence over the Armenians.174
Two further articles described the proceedings of an
international conference on self determination for oppressed
nationalities that included hearings as to the future of the
Armenians. The conference was meant to “plan for the development
of an American international policy toward oppressed or
dependent nationalities through their representatives in
America.”175 The conference heard speakers on behalf of numerous
minorities throughout Europe including the Jews, Serbians,
Belgians, Poles, and Ukrainians, who all pleaded for American
influence in granting them independence. Both articles

173
174
175

“Sees End of Turkey,” Washington Post, April 19, 1915, 1.
“Allies’ Reply Ready,” Washington Post, December 30, 1916, 1.
“Ask Aid for Oppressed,” Washington Post, December 12, 1916, 4.

99

summarized a selection of the conference’s hearings and quoted
famous speakers yet never any concerning the Armenians. Instead,
they only mentioned the Armenians as one of many groups
receiving consideration and do not pay further attention to the
distinct future of Armenia.176
The previous articles contained some of the only references
in the Post relating to the post-war future of Armenia, and then
they are only alluded to as part of larger international
negotiations. Specific description of the Allies’ plans for the
future of Armenia always named Russia as a guardian to an
autonomous, not independent, region, reinforcing Russia’s
historical interest in Asia Minor and the Turkish Straits. In
addition, Russia’s principal role suggested reluctance on the
part the other Allied Powers to commit protection to a free
Armenia in the post-war balance of power. International
conferences debating the future of many of Europe’s oppressed
minorities illustrate the large number of peoples asking for
assistance and the many potential obligations the Great Powers
would encounter if they upheld the ideal of self-determination
at subsequent peace conferences.
The second sub-topic theme is the use of the Armenian
massacres as supporting evidence for ulterior motives; there are
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six articles. The first, in March 1915, reprinted an essay
written by Viscount Bryce, former British Ambassador to the
United States, on his views of American public opinion on the
nations at war. In the article, Bryce argued the American people
favored the cause of the Allies against the militarism of
Germany. He cited examples such as the American protection of
English subjects in belligerent countries and American efforts
at providing relief in Armenia and Palestine to the victims of
the Central Powers excesses as proof that Americans prefer the
Allies.177
A similar article used the Armenians in an argument on the
German violations of submarine warfare. It claimed Germany
violated humane morals and American rights in the destruction of
property and safety. The article argued the American people
abhor all forms of inhumanity, including the massacre of the
Armenians, not just humanitarian violations by Germany.178
Two related articles recounted speeches by British leaders,
one condemning German control over Turkey and the other
criticizing President Wilson’s foreign policy. In both,
knowledge of Armenian suffering was used to condemn the actions
of an international power. In “Fears Prolonged War,” Premier
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Asquith claimed “that by lifting a finger Germany might have
arrested the Armenian horrors” in a warning against a German
controlled Turkey in the post-war international balance of
power.179 Likewise, in a speech attacking American policy, the
dean of Westminster blamed President Wilson for his compliance
in the Armenian persecutions.180
The final two articles, both appearing as front page,
headline news, reported on speeches given by former president
Theodore Roosevelt, condemning the Wilson administration’s
neutrality. In them Roosevelt said he was shamed by United
States inaction, and that the United States had “been no use to
the Armenians,”181 and had clung to the “most selfish neutrality
...at the expense of the Belgians and the Armenians”.182
Roosevelt used the vulnerability of weak countries or peoples as
a way to criticize American isolationism.
In these examples, the Armenians and their suffering was
used to support ulterior agendas, primarily to condemn the
German government and support United States entry into the war
on the side of the Allies. In each case, the Armenians became a
piece of evidence, a tool to make a point. The articles placed
the Armenian persecutions into the larger perspective of a
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global war in which many groups of people suffered as a
consequence. While none of the articles actively diminished the
plight of the Armenians, neither did they propose action to
specifically aid the Armenians, with the exception of American
entry into the war.
The third sub-topic theme involves correlations between the
Armenians and military affairs. As previously discussed, some
formerly reviewed articles in an earlier category reported on a
connection between military engagements and the spread or
severity of massacres. This sub-topic theme has similarities and
differences to those previously reviewed articles, in that while
a connection exists, it did not necessarily denote a military
engagement.
Several articles reported on military encounters and their
impact on the Armenians. One focused on the lack of media
attention paid to fighting occurring outside of the major
theaters of war, including the Caucasus. It addressed the
success of the Russian military in the region and the attacks by
Kurdish irregulars against the Armenians.183 Similarly, two
additional articles reported on Russian military successes in
relation to the Armenians, stating the Russian military took
into account the Armenian population when maneuvering in the
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region so as not to expose them to Turkish revenge.184 The
Russian army also vowed to relieve Armenian suffering and
execute Turkish civil officers responsible for implementing
massacres.185
In further examples, two stories addressed the Armenians in
correlation with the military in a different way. One covered a
session of the Russian Duma addressing war needs and praised the
Armenians for their courage of spirit in facing the persecutions
and fighting back by joining the Russian army as volunteers.186
Another cited a statement by the Turkish embassy to refute
rumors of defeats and named Russian military failures in
Anatolia as the source behind Armenian uprisings. It said the
Russian army exploited Armenian peasants and encouraged them to
rebel when the Russian army failed to push back the Turks.187
Articles covering military issues are varied in their
reference to the Armenians. Some contain references similar to
other articles, drawing a connection between military
engagements and the Armenian persecutions. More interesting are
the articles citing the existence of Armenian volunteers to the
Russian army, and Turkish accusation of Russian interference in
inciting Armenian rebellions. In the first instance, the
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existence of Armenian volunteers would corroborate the Ottoman
charge that the Armenians were traitorously cooperating with the
Russian enemy and consequently legitimize the Turkish decision
to deport them away from the front lines. In the second case,
the Armenians were seen as pawns in an international ploy to
force the Turkish government to suppress the Armenians and
become the villain. The American public had to weigh these
images of the Armenians against other media coverage when
developing an opinion of the Armenian Genocide.
The fourth sub-topic theme is the Armenians in the context
of the political climate in Turkey. The subordinate reference
category has a large number of articles covering the political
situation in Turkey, most of which were negative. Articles
reported on a situation in Turkey, citing numerous clues as to a
worsening crisis. As evidence they described the spread of
espionage, Turkish secret police efforts in censoring free
speech, and criticism of the government. They reported the Young
Turk party was reduced to a political figure head by the secret
committee of elite members who launched a “reign of terror”
against their political opponents.188 Other stories stated the
Turkish army suffered from sedition “spreading among the
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regiments of the garrison,” and government officials feared
assassination attempts.189
References to Armenians in this context varied. In most
cases the articles reported on the continuing persecution of
Armenians. They tied the deteriorating political climate to
persecution of Christians, who became the targets of Turkish
secret police, and Young Turk attempts to foment anti-Christian
agitation.190 In multiple stories, Armenian persecution was
compared to threats of similar treatment against Greek
Christians.191 In one rare case, a story reporting on the
vulnerable condition of the Turkish army mentioned dismissal of
a religious figure in the government for criticizing the
persecution of Armenians.192
References to Armenians in this circumstance were so varied
they do not constitute a significant perspective. The stories
are more cohesive in their coverage of political crisis in
Turkey than they were in tying it to Armenian persecutions.
Articles in this sub-topic theme also repeated themes
articulated in more depth in other categories, namely the
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presence of anti-Christian sentiment and massacre of Armenians.
The fact that coverage referred to the Armenians within stories
on Turkish struggles drew a correlation between them. It implied
Turkish persecution of Armenians was a manifestation of the
deteriorating circumstances in Turkey and further suggested the
Armenians became a scapegoat for Turkish military defeats and
civilian suffering.
As references to Armenians in the articles of this category
were minor, often merely a phrase, their contribution to an
understanding of the Armenian Genocide in the eyes of the
American public can also only be minor. The main topic of the
articles would have had a much more significant impact than any
minor sub-topics, of which the Armenians were one of many.
Portrayal of Armenians in this category were most valuable for
the ways in which they substantiated themes in other categories
and to understand that political figures used the Armenians as
evidence to support their agendas.

Location
The final category is location. It includes all the
articles that make use of the word “Armenia” or “Armenian” as a
location or a description of a location. These articles do not
contain any information on the persecution of Armenians,
international action concerning the massacres, or aid to
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refugees. They primarily concern military movements and are
included for analysis as they are useful references on dates and
locations of military engagements to compare with the spread or
severity of massacres.
This category contains a total of ten articles. The
articles are sporadically dispersed throughout the twenty-four
month period of survey, beginning in February 1915 and ending in
December 1916 including two front page articles but no headline
news. (Refer to Table 2 and Table 6).
Nine of the ten articles report on military engagements in
Armenia. The first sub-topic theme is early Turkish military
success in Armenia. The first of three articles with this theme
was printed in February 1915. It told of the surprising
successes of the Turkish army in Armenia, who recovered from
slow mobilization to push back the Russians. It attributed the
success to the influence of German military officers.193 The
second article, in July of the same year, said Turkish patrols
pushed into Russia to harass Russian outposts. Russia suffered
losses in its attempt to repulse the Turkish attacks.194 A final
article printed early in 1916 contained news out of Berlin. The
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article refuted claims in British news sources that Russian
forces had taken Erzerum or surrounded the fortress.195
The second sub-topic theme is Russian military success in
Armenia. Six articles gave continuous accounts of Russian
advances further into Turkey toward Constantinople.

Citing

information from the Russian War Office, one article said
Russian forces inflicted heavy losses on the Turks and captured
Turkish military officers “as well as a number of the rank and
file” in Armenia.196 Additional articles continued the theme,
reporting the landing of troops along the Black Sea coast
region, and detailed information on the Russian advance in Asia
Minor as part of a three pronged attack to capture Bitlis.197
Eight of the ten articles, all on the military engagements,
came from Allied news sources. Most came out of Petrograd, with
some from London and one from Paris, with the exception of one
from Berlin. Five of the articles with information coming out of
Petrograd cited their source as official statements from the
Russian war office. Allied news sources were more likely to
report military successes to boost morale and appear strong on
the international front. Propaganda can not be ruled out as a
motivation for publication of articles on military successes.
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The last article in this category is unrelated to military
engagements. It is a Bulletin of the National Geographic Society
published March 1916. It discussed the city of Diarbekir in Asia
Minor. As a city strategically located on the banks of the
Tigris River, it had been fought over by numerous groups
throughout history including the Armenians. As a result, the
city suffered a massive population decline.198 This unique
article presented the military conflict in Armenia outside the
context of the contemporary world war and instead portrayed the
region as a coveted, strategic location throughout history. In
this case, the Armenians were not singular victims but instead
one of many groups fighting over a region that has suffered
exploitation and population decline as a result.
This category is extremely small and therefore unlikely to
have had a major impacted on the overall tone of media coverage
on the Armenian Genocide or American’s reaction to it. The most
important feature of this category is its lack of any reference
to the persecution of Armenians. While many articles in other
categories made use of the words “Armenia” or “Armenian” for
locative purposes, they contain news of other topics as well.
These specific articles, coming primarily from Allied news
sources, purposely neglected any reference to persecutions.
Articles in the description category note a correlation between
198

“War Is No Novelty Here,” Washington Post, April 1, 1916, 6.

110

Russian military movements and the outbreak of massacres.

It is

possible that official Russian statements from the war office
did not want reports of massacres tied to news of troop
movements, as they might indicate Russian responsibility in
provoking Turkish persecutions.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative component of the content analysis examines
the prominence the Washington Post gave to the Armenian
Genocide. Prominence was determined by using five topics of
inquiry: total number of articles, total number of editions
featuring stories on the Armenians, number of front page and
headline articles, number of stories based on the day of the
week, month, and year, and types of foreign news sources used by
the Post.

Total Number of Articles and Editions
The Washington Post printed one hundred eighty articles
featuring the word “Armenia” or “Armenian” in the twenty-four
month period from January 1, 1915, to December 30, 1916. In the
same twenty-four months, the Post published seven hundred thirty
editions of the paper. Out of those seven hundred thirty
editions, thirteen editions contained more than one article,
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five editions contained three articles, and one edition
contained four articles on the Armenians. Consequently, only one
hundred fifty-three of seven hundred thirty potential editions
covered anything related to the Armenians. (Refer to Table 1.)
The Post published articles on the Armenians in less than
one fourth of its editions in the two-year period. Without
comparing articles published on another topic, for instance the
invasion of Belgium, it is difficult to gage whether the
attention the Post gave to the Armenians is more or less than it
gave to other subjects. Still, coverage in less than one fourth
of editions seems to be a small amount. Given the newspaper’s
anti-war stance while America remained a neutral country, it
could be predicted that the paper gave limited coverage to all
topics relating to the war or any issues it deemed might provoke
American sentiment to favor joining the war.

Front Page and Headline Articles
The Post printed twenty-seven articles about the Armenians
on the front page, fourteen of which were located at the top,
above the fold. The description and subordinate reference
categories had equal number of nine front page stories.
International action was second with five front page articles,
and location and aid had equal number of two articles. The
subordinate reference category had nine headline stories,
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description had three, international action and aid had equal
number of one, and location had no headline articles. (Refer to
Table 6).
Stories about the Armenians appeared on the front page in
less than one sixth of the total number of articles, and in less
than one tenth of stories, the information appeared as a
headline article, above the fold. It is not surprising the
description category shared for the highest number of front page
articles. Descriptive coverage of the Armenian Genocide was the
most graphic type and the most likely to provoke a reaction from
readers. As stories in the description category were among the
earliest printed, its front page articles were prominent for
both their location in the paper and the chronology.
The subordinate reference category shared the same number
of front page articles. In these stories, the Armenians did not
figure prominently, and so the articles’ placement can have the
slightest bearing on shaping public opinion. The articles’ main
topic had more effect on its position on the front page than did
information about the Armenians.

Articles by Day, Month, and Year
The Post printed one hundred eighty articles in the twentyfour month period, fifty-two, a little over one fourth, on
Sundays. Sunday editions of the Post in both 1915 and 1916
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contained the most articles, in some cases more than three times
the number in other days of the week. The Sunday edition of the
Post was the largest, with multiple sections. (Refer to Table
4.)
Of the one hundred eighty articles, the Post printed
ninety-seven in 1915 and eighty-three in 1916. In 1915, October
had the highest number of twenty-two stories, and in 1916
February and October had an equal number of fifteen articles.
(Refer to Table 3.)

Articles by Source
Of the one hundred eighty articles, sixty-seven, slightly
over one third, did not name a location or city as a source of
information. The one hundred twenty-three remaining articles
identified twenty-two different cities or regions as sources.
Six of the cities were domestic and the rest were international,
with the exception of Armenia, which is a region. Multiple
articles cited more than one source, so the one hundred eighty
stories had a total of one hundred ninety sources. (Refer to
Table 5.)
The sources of information for the media in reporting the
Armenian Genocide is very important to understanding any
potential filters or interpretations on the content. As
previously noted, the Washington Post did not have any
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international correspondents, so it was limited to using
international or larger domestic news outlets for its
information. Information often passes through multiple media
outlets, and consequently potential censors, before reaching the
Post. In some cases the Post printed articles from international
newspapers verbatim, and in other cases the information was
incorporated into an original article. Most articles named the
city of origin, and in some cases the international newspaper,
that initially reported the information. The United States was a
neutral country in the early war years and so had wider access
to information out of Turkey through Ambassador Morgenthau than
some countries. Great Britain cut the lines of communication
from Germany early in the war, so American newspapers had
limited access to German news sources. With this being the case,
few news sources out of Turkey or Germany were used, instead
news came heavily out of Entente countries. Cities used as news
sources include Petrograd, Paris, London, Rome, New York,
Tiflis, Berlin, Athens, Van, Tabriz, Basle, Amsterdam, and
Boston. Most information coming out of Armenia or Persia came
through Russian or British sources respectively. It is difficult
to pinpoint any exact bias on the information based on the
channels it passed through without a detailed comparison of
story content based on the city of origin, the analysis of the
media coverage must be viewed with the potential biases in mind.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The Armenian Genocide tested the depth and commitment of
the American ideals of humanitarianism and democracy. American
efforts to save the Armenians through relief work had its limits
when it came time to back the cause of a free and independent
Armenia. During the war, the Armenian cause experienced
unprecedented popularity as the American public rallied to
provide relief and aid to the suffering Armenians. At the close
of the war, the cause of Armenian statehood was swept up in the
idealism that dominated the peace discussion. Yet the
“unparalleled tragedy of the genocide lent the impetus, but did
not inspire a political solution to the Armenian catastrophe.”199
From the signing of the Mudros Armistice to the Treaty of
Lausanne, the movement for an Armenian homeland disintegrated
and lost the attention and emotion of the American public. The
activism of the relief effort vanished as America withdrew back
into isolationism and “would seem to suggest that most American
felt they had discharged their responsibilities toward the
Armenians through the activities of relief organizations.”200
American commitment to the Armenians was defeated by disunity in
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the Armenian independence movement and the growth of
isolationism in American politics after the war, which tested
“the relationship between poplar appeals for aid and justice and
the limits of what the federal government would and would not do
for a foreign people.”201
During the war the cause of the Armenians received
widespread attention in the United States. Through its position
as a neutral nation in the early war years, the United States
had the potential to influence the Ottoman government. The
American ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, informed the
United States State Department of the persecutions of Turkish
Armenians early in 1915 and continued as an ardent supporter of
the Armenian cause for many years thereafter. Morgenthau
beseeched help from American relief organizations to raise funds
to assist displaced and suffering Armenians. The American public
was familiar with responding to humanitarian crises during World
War I and from the initial days of the war participated in
relief movements to help the Belgians, Poles, Serbs, and others.
Morgenthau relayed news of Turkish atrocities, which
corroborated similar reports from American missionaries in
Turkey to their organizations. The reaction was swift, fierce,
and began a chain reaction of relief efforts for the Armenians
that lasted throughout the war and after.
201
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One of the earliest organizations created in response to
the Armenian crisis was the American Committee on Armenian
Atrocities (ACAA).202 The leaders of the committee combined
Christian ideals on philanthropy and bureaucratic skills in
fundraising and public relations, a stellar combination. They
immediately began to publicize the importance of relief
throughout the United States, aided greatly by the new media.
Media coverage of the Armenian atrocities played a significant
role in informing and shaping public opinion and altering people
to the efforts of relief organizations. The ACAA quickly
implemented a national education campaign, using pamphlets and
speakers to incite sympathy for the Armenians, and established
local committees around the country to collect funds. They held
mass rallies in New York and Philadelphia and collected money at
football games in response to continuing pleas from Morgenthau
for funds. Overwhelming response from the American public
promoted the federal government to establish a special day for
Armenian relief to collect supplies and unify the cause.
Churches across the country used their pulpits, collection
services, and Sunday school classes to teach people about the
Armenian persecutions and spur activism. The American public
rallied around the Armenian cause on a massive scale and the
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tragedy brought the “status of Armenia closer to the American
heart than ever before.”203
American relief efforts were aided by America’s neutral
status in the early war years. Relief organizations had access
to information from consuls in Turkey and reports to the State
Department to use in its publicity campaign. Additionally,
consular officials had authority to administer the relief funds
collected to the needy in the Ottoman Empire.204 Throughout the
early efforts to alleviate the suffering of Armenians, the
United States government never threatened military intervention
in the Ottoman Empire to stop the massacres. The Wilson
administration clung to its isolationist policy, and never
viewed the Armenian crisis as “sufficiently important to justify
an official ultimatum to the Turkish authorities.”205 When a
declaration of war against Germany became imminent in the spring
of 1917, American policy toward Turkey and the Armenians came to
the forefront. The media played a large role in influencing
American public opinion. Graphic descriptions of Armenian
persecutions in the media coverage, and corresponding
vilification of the Turk,206 embittered the American people, who
favored war with Turkey. Yet, President Wilson faced pressure to
avoid war with Turkey from the same groups who were working to
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provide relief to those suffering at the hands of the Turks.
American missionary groups sought to avoid war with the Ottoman
Empire to “safeguard nearly a century of American Board
investment in the region,”207 and not to jeopardize post-war
missionary work in the country.208 American failure to declare
war on Turkey allowed for the continuation of relief work and
tabled the Armenian Question until the end of the war.
The ideal of self-determination dominated the post-war
political climate, giving the Armenians hope in their desire for
independence. Following the defeat of the Central Powers at the
end of the war, the popularity of the Armenian cause in the
United States took on a political air. President Wilson’s
Fourteen Points “boosted hopes for Armenian self-determination
to unprecedented heights.”209 Dedication to the Armenian cause
was grounded in American sympathy for Armenian suffering during
the war, and a feeling of responsibility to make it right.
America’s failure to defend the Armenians and ensure the
existence of an independent state is due to number of factors.
The matter of Armenian independence was tied to America’s
acceptance of a mandate for the nascent country. The American
public was largely in favor of a mandate for Armenia. Support
for it was published by newspapers and religious
207
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organizations.210 New organizations comprised of Armenian
Americans and prominent American activists took up the cause,
the most influential being the American Committee for the
Independence of Armenia (ACIA) and the America-Armenia society
(ASS). These two committees differed in their approach to
securing the future of Armenia, with the ASS favoring a
mandate211 and the ACIA favoring direct American aid to
Armenia.212 Conflict in the movement for Armenian independence
weakened it. The staunch nationalist aims of the ACIA clashed
with the missionary interests of the ASS, leaving the movement
“scattered and unorganized”213 and working against each other to
secure approval of a mandate.
The divisions within the movement for Armenian independence
were not the only factors working against it. The American
mandate for Armenia was tied to Congress’ ratification of the
peace treaty and League of Nations. President Wilson faced
immediate opposition to the peace treaty upon his return from
Europe in the summer of 1919. Resistance in the Senate was led
by isolationist Henry Cabot Lodge, who waged a fierce campaign
to defeat the treaty. Wilson tried to rally public support for
210
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the treaty in a tour of the West to educate Americans. He used
public support for the Armenian cause to promote the treaty,
knowing “it had been a cause dear to the hearts of Americans.”214
Still his efforts were not enough. The Senate first rejected the
League of Nations Covenant in November 1919. The Armenian cause
was now firmly “entangled in the Wilson-Lodge feud and the
larger morass of partisan politics.”215 When Wilson submitted the
mandate proposal the following May, the American public
responded silently to Wilson’s pleas and Congress rejected the
mandate resolution, “unencumbered by popular pressure.”216
The failure of the American mandate for Armenia marked the
rapid decline of American support for the Armenian cause.
Content analysis of Washington Post news coverage of the
Armenian Genocide from 1915 to 1916 reveals the American public
had a solid foundation of information about the Armenian
Genocide. Beginning early in 1915, the Post published articles
on the massacre of Armenians in Turkey. It continued publication
of news on the topic in a consistent pace through the end of the
twenty-four month period surveyed, and undoubtedly continued
through the break in diplomatic relations with Turkey and
possibly until the end of the war and afterward.
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The Post’s media coverage included graphic details of
systematic atrocities committed against the Armenians. The Post
made readers abundantly aware of the suffering of Armenian
refugees and invoked sympathy by identifying Armenians as good
Christians being persecuted at the hands of villainous Turks.
The Post gave a large amount of attention in the media coverage
to the affect the massacres had on Americans living in Turkey.
American readers at home could establish a mental connection to
the massacres when reading about the experiences of their fellow
countrymen.
The media coverage provided Americans with knowledge of the
international reaction to the massacres. The public knew about
Allied outrage at Germany and Turkey for condoning such
persecutions and the American government’s lukewarm threats to
Turkey to cease the massacres. There is an unmistakable lack of
coverage on any public outcry for the United States government
to do more politically to help the Armenians; undoubtedly
because such pressure was nonexistent. Historical scholarship
and analysis of the Post confirms a widespread movement in
American culture to assist the Armenians through humanitarian
efforts. Yet, sympathy for Armenian suffering did not reach to
the doors of the Capital building in the form of a powerful
lobby to insist on American intervention in Ottoman Turkey.
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The Post’s attention to the Armenian cause included
extensive coverage on the ways Americans reacted to the news and
the outpouring of support through efforts to provide aid to
Armenia. The massive humanitarian movement to raise funds to
assist Armenian refugees is recounted in the words of the Post,
alerting Americans as to their efforts of their countrymen and
inspiring continued action.
It is clear the Washington Post paid attention to the
Armenian Genocide. Yet, the failure of the mandate for Armenia
proved the fleeting nature of America’s commitment to the
Armenians. The outpouring of sympathy and responsibility
provoked and recounted in the media coverage was limited to
humanitarian efforts and failed to extend to political
protection of Armenian independence. Today the story of Armenian
suffering and the abandonment of the Armenian cause is but a
minor, and often overlooked, chapter in the larger saga of the
First World War. Americans, certainly the readers of the
Washington Post, learned about, reacted to, and then neglected
the Armenian tale so swiftly after the war; it can be no
surprise that almost one hundred years later American
remembrance of the tragic events is minuscule. American memory
of the Armenian Genocide had a foundation in the media coverage
offered in its most political of cities, but it has eroded over
time.
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3
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IA
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2
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IA
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Saturday

1
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D
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What Father Dakras Saw
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Sunday

M5
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D
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Report
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11-29-1915

Monday

1

14,415

D

12-01-1915

Wednesday

2

14,417

IA

72

88

134

89

Assail US Inaction

12-01-1915

Wednesday

2

14,417

IA

90

New Cardinals

12-06-1915

Monday

2

14,422

SR

91

Anxiety in England

12-12-1915

Saturday

18

14,427

SR

92

Try to Save Christians

12-12-1915

Saturday

20

14,427

IA

93

To Raise Armenian Corps

12-12-1915

Saturday

20

14,427

IA

94

12-21-1915

Tuesday

3

14,437

IA

12-22-1915

Wednesday

3

14,438

SR

96

British Intrigue Caused Armenians
Massacres, Declares German Writer
Turkey’s Food, Cotton and Copper
Plentiful Asserts Moslem Leader
Germans Defend Armenians

12-23-1915

Thursday

2

14,439

IA

97

Bulgars Kill Armenians

12-26-1915

Sunday

13

14,442

D

01-02-1916

Sunday

ES2

14,449

IA

95

1916
98

01-10-1916

Monday

6

14,457

SR

100

American Missionaries Investigate
Condition of Armenian Refugees
Full Freedom of the Seas to Our
Nationals and Our Commerce
1,5000 Armenians Are Killed

01-15-1916

Saturday

3

14,462

D

101

Americans and Armenians

01-22-1916

Saturday

2

14,469

IA

102

Armenians Only Removed

01-23-1916

Sunday

R5

14,470

IA

103

Bryce Sends Appeal Here

01-26-1916

Wednesday

4

14,473

IA

104

T. R. Ready for War

01-31-1916

Monday

1

14,478

SR

105

Turks Halt Russians

02-02-1916

Wednesday

3

14,480

L

106

02-06-1916

Sunday

14

14,484

D

107

American Woman Missionary Gives
Pictures of Armenian’s Fate
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02-10-1916

Thursday

2

14,488

AID

108

Fresh Massacres Reported

02-14-1916

Monday

3

14,492

D
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02-16-1916

Wednesday

2
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IA

110

Porte Accuses Entente Powers of
Enticing Armenians to Uprising
Armenian Fort Captured

02-19-1916

Saturday

1

14,497

L
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Turks Fight at Bay

02-19-1916

Saturday

1

14, 497

SR
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US Warns the Sultan
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Saturday

2

14,497

IA

99

135

113

Russians Land New Army in Armenia

02-20-1916

Sunday

1

14,498

L

114

Makes Plea for Armenians

02-20-1916

Sunday

3

14,498

IA
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Sultan Says Armenian Rebellion Made
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so as to Protect Army
Fleeing Turks Being Massacred by
Armenians is Report to Rome
Armenian People Victims

02-20-1916

Sunday

6

14,498

IA

02-21-1916

Monday

3

14,499

D

02-23-1916

Wednesday

1

14,501

IA

116
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118

02-23-1916

Wednesday

4

14,501

SR

119

Plot to Kill Kaiser; by Marquise de
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Morgenthau Sees Wilson

02-26-1916

Saturday

2

14,504

IA

120

Russians Take Bitlis

03-04-1916

Saturday

4

14,511

L

121

War Is No Novelty Here

04-01-1916

Saturday

6

14,539

L

122

Turkey Appeals for Food

04-09-1916

Sunday

ES9

14.547

SR

123

Million Armenians Killed

04-16-1916

Sunday

13

14.554

D

124

America’s Aid to Stricken

04-16-1916

Sunday

ES4

14.554

AID

125

04-23-1916

Sunday

A12

14,561

D

126

Sooren, Most Famous of Armenians
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15,000 Slain by Turks

05-07-1916

Sunday

ES14

14575

D

127

Morgenthau to Speak Here

05-15-1916

Monday

4

14,583

IA

128
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05-15-1916

Monday

10
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IA

129
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06-04-1916

Sunday

A2
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IA

130

Congress Condensed
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Friday

6

14,608

IA

131
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06-17-1916

Saturday

3
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AID

132
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06-22-1916
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6
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AID

133

Favor Day for Armenians Relief

06-25-1916

Sunday

17
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AID

134
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Saturday

7
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AID

135

$2,000,000 Spent on War Relief by
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07-03-1916

Monday

2

14,632

IA
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House for Armenian Day

07-20-1916

Thursday

5

14,649

AID

136
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Concerning the Turk

07-24-1916

Monday

4

14,653

SR

138

Holds UP US Relief

07-30-1916

Sunday

A12

14,659

IA

139
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Sunday

A13

14,659

IA

140

New Envoy to Porte Sees Wilson
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Sunday

ES5

14,659

IA

141

08-08-1916

Tuesday

3

14,668

D

142

Starving Armenians Devour Dead;
Driven To and Fro Over Desert
Armenians Eat Children

08-20-1916

Sunday

A7

14,679

D

143

Patriarchate is Abolished

08-20-1916

Sunday

RE7

14, 679

IA

144

Wilson Names War Fund Days

08-27-1916

Sunday

A6

14,686

IA

145

Cruiser Wreaked

08-30-1916

Wednesday

1

14,689

SR

146

Wilson Calls For War Relief

09-09-1916

Saturday

10

14,697

AID

147

Sanctions Syrian Aid

09-15-1916

Friday

3

14,703

IA

148

Huge U.S. War Gifts

09-21-1916

Thursday

1

14,709

AID

149

Armenians to Get Food

09-22-1916

Friday

1

14,710

AID

150

Denied U.S. Relief Ship to Syria

10-1-1916

Sunday

3

14,791

AID

151

Ask $5000 Relief

10-04-1916

Wednesday

3

14,722

AID

152

Church Girls to Help

10-08-1916

Sunday

7

14,726

AID

153

Bryce Appeals for Help

10-08-1916

Sunday

11

14,726

AID

154

Volunteer for Relief Work

10-09-1916

Monday

10

14,727

AID

155

Relief Plans Formulated

10-11-1916

Wednesday

10

14,729

AID

156

Episcopal Convention Opens

10-12-1916

Thursday

3

14,730

SR

157

War Relief for Syria

10-15-1916

Sunday

A5

14,733

AID

158

10-16-1916

Monday

6

14,734

AID

159

Urges Response to Call for Relief
of Armenia; by Lucy Thoumaian
Society Girls in War Relief

10-20-1916

Friday

12

14,738

AID

160

Relief Day in Churches

10-22-1916

Sunday

13

14,740

AID

137

161

Relief Donations Large

10-22-1916

Sunday

15

14,740

AID

162

War Aid by Churches

10-23-1916

Monday

5

14,741

AID

163

Red Cross Chapter Meets Today

10-25-1916

Wednesday

4

14,743

AID

164

US Shamed, T. R.

10-29-1916

Sunday

1

14,747

SR

165

Fears Prolonged War

11-10-1916

Friday

5

14,759

SR

166

Goes to Feed Syrians

11-14-1916

Tuesday

5

14,763

AID

167

6,000 Armenians Killed

11-24-1916

Friday

3

14,773

D

168

Turks Hold Americans

11-29-1916

Wednesday

1

14,778

SR

169

Marooned Americans

11-30-1916

Thursday

6

14,779

SR

170

Champion Lifesaver

12-03-1916

Sunday

S4

14,782

D

171

Uphold Small Nation

12-11-1916

Monday

3

14,790

SR

172

Ask Aid for Oppressed

12-12-1916

Tuesday

4

14,791

SR

173

Heads Red Cross Again

12-14-1916

Thursday

3

14,793

SR

174

Armenians Thank Wilson

12-15-1916

Friday

3

14,794

IA

175

A Resourceful American

12-16-1916

Saturday

6

14,795

D

176

Start $1,000,000 War Relief

12-17-1916

Sunday

R5

14,796

AID

177

U.S. Turns on Turkey

12-19-1916

Tuesday

3

14,798

IA

178

Must End Military Brigandage

12-26-1916

Tuesday

2

14,805

SR

179

Turkish Village Taken

12-28-1916

Thursday

3

14,807

L

180

Allies’ Reply Ready

12-30-1916

Saturday

1

14,809

SR
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Table 2
Articles by Month and Category
1915

Jan 1915
Feb 1915
March 1915
April 1915
May 1915
June 1915
July 1915
Aug 1915
Sept 1915
Oct 1915
Nov 1915
Dec 1915
Total 1915
Jan 1916
Feb 1916
March 1916
April 1916
May 1916
June 1916
July 1916
Aug 1916
Sept 1916
Oct 1916
Nov 1916
Dec 1916
Total 1916
Total 19151916

Description Location Sub
Ref
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
5
0
2
5
0
1
0
0
0
3
1
3
8
1
5
4
0
1
5
0
2
3
0
0
1
0
3
37
4
19
1916
1
0
2
3
3
2
0
1
0
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
3
2
1
5
12
6
17
49

10

36

139

IAction
0
0
0
1
2
1
0
1
5
12
2
6
30

Aid

Total

0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
3
0
0
7

2
2
3
8
8
3
7
15
12
22
5
10
97

4
6
0
0
2
4
6
2
0
0
0
2
26

0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
4
13
1
1
22

7
15
1
5
3
5
7
5
4
15
5
11
83

56

29

180

Table 3
Articles by Month and Year
1915

1916

January

2

7

February

2

15

March

3

1

April

8

5

May

8

3

June

3

5

July

7

7

August

15

5

September

12

4

October

22

15

November

5

5

December

10

11

Total

97

83

Table 4
Articles by Day of Week
1915

1916

Monday

18

12

Tuesday

15

5

Wednesday

15

10

Thursday

7

8

Friday

7

7

Saturday

11

13

Sunday

24

28

Total

97

83
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Table 5
Articles Sources by Location
No Location
Amsterdam
Armenia
Athens
Berlin
Boston
Bucharest
Chicago
Constantinople
Julfa
London
Milan
New York
Norfolk
Paris
Petrograd
Philadelphia
Rome
Sofia
St. Louis
Tabriz
Tiflis
Van
Total

Description
7
1
1
1

Location
3

Sub Ref
14

1

4
1

4
1

I-Action
23
1
1
8
4

Aid
20

1
1

1
13

3

6
3
2

1
5

2

2

7
1
3

7

1

9

3
1

2
1

2

2
1
1

2
9
1
54

13

141

37

1

1

57

29

Total
67
2
1
6
10
9
1
1
4
1
31
1
21
1
4
9
1
4
1
1
2
11
1
190

Table 6
Front Page and Headline Articles
Total
Description

49

Front
Page
9

International
Action
Aid

56

5

1

29

2

1

Subordinate
Reference
Location

36

9

9

10

2

0

180

27

14

Total

142

Headline
3
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